|
God
BEING OF GOD
pp. Being of God. We know there was being from eternity and this being
must be intelligent, for how does our mind refuse to believe that there
should be being from all eternity without its being conscious to itself
that it was. That there should be from all eternity and yet nothing
know, all that while, that anything is — this is really a contradiction.
We may see it to be so though we know not how to express it. For in what
respect has anything a being when there is nothing conscious of its
being? And in what respect has anything a being that angels nor men nor
no created intelligence know nothing of, but only as God knows it to be?
Not at all, any more than there are sounds where none hears or colors
where none sees. Thus, for instance, supposing a room in which none is,
none sees in that room, no created intelligence. The things in the room
have no being any other way than only as God is conscious of them, for
there is no color, nor any sound, nor any shape, etc. (See M 94.)
27a. God. God is a
necessary being because it’s a contradiction to suppose him not to be. A
being is a necessary being whose nonentity is a contradiction. We have
shown that absolute nothing is the essence of all contradiction. [See Of
Being, p.1.] But being in order is all that we call God, who is, and
there is none else besides him.
91. Being of God. It is
acknowledged by all to be self-evident that nothing can begin to be
without cause. Neither can we prove it any other way than by explaining
it. When understood, it is a truth that irresistably will have place in
the assent. Thus, if we suppose a time wherein there was nothing, a body
will not of its own accord begin to be. It is what the understanding
abhors, that it should be when there was no manner of reason why it was.
So it is equally self-evident that a being cannot begin to be, as to the
manner of its being, without a cause, as that when a body has been
perfectly at rest that it should begin to move without any reason,
either within itself or without. So that, ‘because it so happened’ will
not satisfy the mind at all. The mind asks what was the reason. So it is
equally self-evident, if equally understood, that there must be a reason
why a body should be after this manner and not after another. Thus, if a
body is a moving body there must be some reason or cause why it is a
moving body, and not a resting body. It must be because of something,
otherwise there is something without a cause, as much as when a body
starts into being of itself. Supposing there are two globes: the one is
a moving globe, the other is resting. The mind asks why the one moves
and the other rests. It is natural to the mind to say something is the
reason why this body moves and not the other; and if it should be said,
no, there is not, nor ever was, any reason or cause why this being
should move more than why the other should, the mind immediately
returns: If there be no reason why one should move more than the other,
why then does one move and the other rest? It abhors the supposition
that there is none. So if two bodies are of different figures, there is
some reason why this is of this shape and that of the other. So when one
body moves with one degree of velocity and another of another, when one
body is of one bigness and another of another, when one body moves with
one direction and another of another, one rests on this place, another,
another. It is exceeding evident that there must be some cause or other
for these things. Wherefore now I ask the question of the different
bodies in the world: Why is this body in this place and not in any or
some other, and why is this body of such dimensions and not of others?
Why is this body of this figure and that of that, and why does this move
and that rest? Why does this body move with just such a degree of
velocity, and why does the planets move west to east and not from east
to west? Something must be the reason of it. If it be said it is so
because it was so from all eternity, or because there was such a
succession of alterations from eternity as to cause it to be so now, how
came it to be so from all eternity? If there can be absolutely no reason
or cause why it should be so any more than why it should be infinite
other ways, then I say it wasn’t so from eternity. And why was there not
another succession of alterations from eternity so as to cause another
sort of alteration now?
124. Existence of God.
There is just the same sort of knowledge of the existence of an
universal mind in the world, from the action of the world and what is
done that is objected to our senses and that is effected by this mind,
as there is of the existence of a particular mind in an human body from
the observation of the actions of that in gesture, look, and voice. And
there wants nothing but a comprehensive view to take in the various
actions in the world and look on them at one glance, and to see them in
their mutual respects and relations. And these would as naturally, as
quick, and with as little ratiocination, and more assuredly indicate to
us an universal mind than human actions do a particular.
125a. Existence of God. It
is certain with me that the world exists anew every moment, that the
existence of things every moment ceases and is every moment renewed. For
instance, in the existence of bodies there has to be resistance or
tendency to some place. It is not numerically the same resistance that
exists the next moment. It is evident because these existences may be in
different places, but yet its existence is continued so far that there
is respect had to it in all the future existences. It is evident in all
things continually, how past existence cannot be continued so that
respect should be had to it otherwise than mentally. If the world this
moment should be annihilated so that nothing should really and actually
exist any more, the existence of the world could not be continued so
that, if another world after a time should be created, that world should
exist after this or that manner from respect to the manner of the
existence of this, or should be so only because this had been thus or
thus. Indeed, we every moment see the same proof of a God as we should
have seen if we had seen him create the world at first. It is only this
way that respect can be had to existence, distant as to place as well as
time. But as much respect is had to distant existence in one sense as in
another.
134. Being of God. It is
evident that none of the creatures, none of the beings that we behold,
are the first principle of their own action, but all alterations follow
in a chain from other alterations. Now, therefore, there must
necessarily be something in itself active so as that it is the very
first beginning of its own actions, or some necessary being that has
been the cause of all the rest, which cannot be matter as it does not
have the nature of matter.
199. Existence of God. The
existence of our own souls, which we know more immediately than
anything, is an argument of exceeding glaring evidence for the existence
of a God. Our souls were not always, but they are wonderful beings,
certainly exceeding in contrivance everything that is seen or can be
seen with eyes. They are pieces of workmanship so curious and of such
amazing contrivance that their operation infinitely exceeds those of any
machines that are seen. Let us consider what has been done and what is
daily done by human souls. What strange contrivance is this, to take in
the sun, moon, and stars, and the whole universe, and bring all distant
things together, and to make past and future things present, to move the
body after such a manner, to produce such strange effects on other souls
and in the corporeal world! If our souls are material machines,
certainly they are so curious that none will deny that they are the
effect of contrivance. Let them be created immediately, or let them be
by propagation, the contrivance is wonderful. What contrivance is
necessary to make such machines that will produce and propagate other
such machines in an infinite succession! And if they be not material,
whence are they if not from a superior immaterial being? And if we say
our souls existed from eternity, who is it orders it so that upon every
generation a soul shall be brought and united to such a parcel of
matter? Or if we say our souls existed in the bodies from eternity,
existing one within another in infinitum, who contrived this matter so?
200. Existence of God. If
the atheist will not acknowledge any great order and regularity in the
corporeal world, he must acknowledge that there is in spirits, in minds,
which will be as much an argument for a contriver as if the contrivance
was in bodies. He must acknowledge that reason, wisdom, and contrivance
are regular actions. But they are the actions of spirits. Many of the
works of men are wonderfully regular, but certainly no more regular than
the contrivance that was the author of them. And who made those beings
that they should act as regularly as the nicest machines of men? Did
such nice beings come into existence by chance or were they not the
effect of a superior contrivance?
Corollary. Hence we see
that all man’s works and human inventions and artifices are arguments of
the existence of God, as well as those that are more immediately the
works of God, for they are only the regular actings of God’s works. When
we walk in stately cities or admire curious machines and inventions, let
us argue the wisdom of God as well as of the immediate contrivers. For
those spirits who were the contrivers are the most wonderful
contrivances.
267. Existence of God. The
mere exertion of a new thought is a certain proof of a God. For
certainly there is something that immediately produces and upholds that
thought. Here is a new thing, and there is a necessity of a cause. It is
not in antecedent thoughts, for they are vanished and gone. They are
past, and what is past is not. But if we say it is the substance of the
soul, if we mean that there is some substance besides that thought that
brings that thought forth, if it be God, I acknowledge it, but if there
be meant something else that has no properties, it seems to me absurd.
If the removal of all properties, such as extension, solidity, thought,
etc., leaves nothing, it seems to me that no substance is anything
besides them. For if there be anything besides, there might remain
something when these are removed.
268. Existence of God.
Innate ideas. That sweet intimation and sort of inward testimony that
men have, upon occasion, of the being of a God, and which is in the mind
of all men however they may endeavor to root it out, is this: In the
first place, the arguing for the being of a God according to the natural
powers from everything we are conversant with is short and easy, and
what we naturally fall into. And in the next place, it appears decorous
and orderly that it should be so, and that natural inclination that
persons have to excellence and order does, as it were, prejudice in
favor of it. When we suffer great injustice, we look to some superior
being to set things to rights, because there is a great resistance of
the soul against that sort of indecorum and we do not know how to
believe if injustice should be done without ever being mended. It is so
abhorrent to nature. So when we have done good or evil, we naturally
expect from some superior being reward or punishment. Thirdly, there is
a habit of the mind in reasoning. We are wont every day, from our very
infancy, to argue causes from effects after the same manner, in general.
And we have such a habit that we believe this or that without standing
to argue about it. Thus we do in many other cases, and as long as we are
thus forced to judge in other things continually, it will return upon us
inevitably when we think anything about the being of a God.
269. Existence of God. If
we allow generation to be merely mechanically performed, yet that the
bodies of men and of all animals and plants should be so contrived that
there should spring endless successions of the same kind of like curious
frames from them is an exceeding bright argument of a deity.
274. Existence of God. The
being of God may be argued from the desirableness and need of it. This
we see in all nature everywhere, that great necessities are supplied. We
should be miserably off without our light in the night, and we have the
moon and stars. In Egypt and India they are very much without rain, and
they have the floods of Ganges and Nile and great deserts. In Greenland
the sun’s rays are exceeding oblique, and he is above the horizon so
much the longer to make it up. Moles have poor eyes, and they have
little occasion for them. Beasts are without reason, and they are guided
by instinct that supplies its place as well. Men are without natural
weapon to fight, and they have reason and hands to make weapons. The
young of insects are not able to provide for themselves nor do their
dams take care of them, but they, by instinct, are laid where they have
their food round about them. Camels are forced, being in dry countries,
to go long without water, and they have a large vessel within them
which, being filled, supplies them a long time. And so it is in
everything. Therefore we cannot think there should be so great and
essential and universal and eternal defect that there should be no wise,
just, and good being to govern the world, that the miseries amongst
reasonable creatures, both through the defect of nature and through
wickedness and injustice (which are infinitely more than in all the rest
of the creation), can never be relieved.
312. Being of God. If we
should suppose that the world is eternal, yet the beauty, contrivance,
and useful disposition of the world would not less strongly conclude for
the being of an intelligent author. It will appear in this question:
Whether or no, if we should see such a poem as Vergil’s Aeneid, it would
be any more satisfying to us if we were told that it was from eternity,
transcribed from copy to copy (though we supposed that a succession of
men had actually existed from eternity), I say, would it be at all more
satisfying than if we were told that it was made by the casual failing
of ink on paper?
333. Scriptures. Being of
God. Christian Religion. The being of God is evident by the Scriptures,
and the Scriptures themselves are an evidence of their own divine
authority, after the same manner as the existence of a human thinking
being is evident by the motions, behavior, and speech of a body of a
human form and contexture, and that the body is animated by a rational
mind. For we know this no otherwise than by the consistency, harmony,
and concurrence of the train of actions and sounds, and that according
to all that we can suppose to be in a rational mind. These are a clear
evidence of an understanding and design that is the original of those
actions. So there is that wondrous universal harmony and consent and
concurrence in the Scriptures: such an universal appearance of a
wonderful glorious design, such stamps everywhere of exalted and divine
wisdom, majesty, and holiness in matter, manner, contexture, and aim —
that the evidence is the same that the Scriptures are the word and work
of a divine mind to one that is thoroughly acquainted with them, as it
is that the words and actions of an understanding man are from a
rational mind to one that has, of a long time, been his familiar
acquaintance. An infant, when it first comes into the world and sees
persons and hears their voices, before it is so much acquainted with
their action and voice, before it has so much comprehension of them as
to see something of their consistence, harmony, and concurrence, makes
no distinction between their bodies and other things, their motion and
sounds, and the motions and sounds of inanimate things. But as its
comprehension increases, the understanding and design begin to appear.
So it is with men that are so little acquainted with the Scriptures, as
in infants with the actions of human bodies. They cannot see any
evidence of a divine mind as the original of it, because they have not
comprehension enough to apprehend the harmony, wisdom, etc.
365. Being of God. The
only reason why we are ready to object against the absolute,
indivisible, unconditional necessity of God’s being is that we are ready
to conceive as if there were some second. We are ready to say, why could
not there have been nothing, as if this were a second. But it is because
of the miserableness of our conceptions that we are ready to imagine any
such supposition. It is but talk whether there be any such supposition
or no, except we knew what nothing was. But we cannot have any such
knowledge because there is no such thing.
383. Being of God. That
the first supreme and universal principle of things from whence results
of the being, the nature, the powers and motions, and sweet order of the
world is properly an intelligent willing agent such as our souls, only
without our imperfections, and not some inconceivable, unintelligent,
necessary agent, seems most rational, because of all the beings that we
see or know anything of, man’s soul only seems to be the image of that
supreme universal principle. These reasons may be given why we should
suppose man’s soul to be the image of that first principle. In the first
place, it is evidently the most perfect and excellent of all the beings
in the lower world. It is very plain that the other creatures are put in
subjection to him and made to be subservient to him. It is rational to
conclude that the most perfect of things that proceed from this
principle should bear most of the image of itself. Second. It is only
the soul of man that does as that supreme principle does. This is a
principle of action, has a power of motion in itself as that first
principle has, and which no unperceiving being in this lower world has.
Man’s soul determines things in themselves indifferent, as motion and
rest, the direction of motion, etc., as the supreme cause does. Man’s
soul has an end in what it does, pursues some good that is the issue of
its actions, as the first universal principle does. Man’s soul makes,
forms, preserves, disposes, and governs things within its sphere as the
first principle does the world. Man’s soul influences the body,
continues its nature and powers and constant regular motions and
productions, and actuates it as the supreme principle does the universe.
So that if there be
anything amongst all the beings that flow from this first principle of
all things, that have any sort of resemblance to it or have anything of
a shadow of likeness to it, spirits or minds bid abundantly the fairest
for it.
587. Being of God.
Necessary Existence. God is a necessary being, as it is impossible but
that God should exist because there is no other way. There is no second
to make a disjunction. There is nothing else supposable. To illustrate
this by one of God’s attributes, take eternity. It is absolutely
necessary that eternity should be, and it is because there is no other
way. To say eternity or not eternity is no disjunction, because there is
no such thing to make a proposition about as no eternity. Nor can we, in
our minds, make any such supposition as not any eternity. We may seem to
make such a supposition in words, but it is no supposition because the
words have no sense in thought to answer them. They are words as much
without any sense in thought that they should signify as these: a
crooked straight line, or a square circle, or a six-angled triangle. If
we go to suppose that there is no eternity, it is the same as if we
should say or suppose that there never was any such thing as duration,
which is a contradiction, for the word ‘never’ implies eternity, and it
is the same as to say there never was any such a duration from all
eternity. So that in the very doubting the thing we affirm it.
650. Being of God.
Necessary Existence. It is from the exceeding imperfect notion that we
have of the nature or essence of God, and because we cannot think of it
but we must think of it far otherwise than it is, that arises the
difficulty in our mind of conceiving of God’s existing without a cause.
It is repugnant to the nature of our souls and what our faculties
utterly refuse to admit that anything that is capable of being one part
of a proper disjunction should exist and be as it is, rather than not
exist or exist otherwise, without causes. Our notions we have of the
divine nature are so imperfect that our imperfect idea admits of a
disjunction, for whatsoever is not absolutely perfect does so. In
everything that is imperfect there is dependence or contingent existence
implied in the nature of it, and we can conceive of its being a part of
a disjunction. There is a ‘thus’ and an ‘otherwise’ in the case. As soon
as ever we have descended one step below absolute perfection,
possibility ceases to be simple: it divides and becomes manifold. Thus,
for instance, we cannot conceive of God without attributing succession
to him, but that notion brings along with it contingent existence and
introduces with it a manifold possibility. There is nothing that exists
in a successive duration but it will necessarily follow from thence that
it is entirely possible that it might exist infinite other ways than it
does, and that it might not exist at all.
It is a contradiction to
suppose that being itself should not be. If anyone says, no, there may
be nothing, he supposes at the same time nothing has a being. And indeed
nothing, when we speak properly, or when the word has any meaning, i.e.,
when we speak of nothing in contradiction to some particular being, has
truly a being.
749. Being of God. The
first cause an intelligent voluntary agent. Nothing can be more plain
than that the make and constitution of the world, in all parts of it, is
with respect to final causes or with an aim at these and these ends to
be obtained. And therefore it seems to be plain that the world must have
a cause, and that this cause is an intelligent and voluntary or
designing agent.
1. It shows that the world must have an efficient cause, for how can
anything but an efficient cause have respect to an end in an effect? If
the world be disposed and ordered for an end, then there must have been
some being that has disposed and ordered it for that end. Its being
ordered for a future end must be from something that has some regard to
futurity, or to what as yet is not. For the end is what is not as yet
obtained when the disposal first is, but is a consequence of the
disposal. It cannot be without any cause or from nothing, for in nothing
there can in no respect be any regard or relation to a future thing. It
cannot be from the thing itself that is disposed, for the relation to
futurity is, by the supposition, the thing that governs the disposal.
And therefore the relation or regard to futurity cannot be consequent on
the disposed or be from the thing itself disposed. As for instance, the
clock’s disposal to tell the hour of the day cannot be from the clock
disposed, because a respect to the notification of the hours of the day
is supposed to govern the disposal of the clock. The world, therefore,
being so disposed that respect is had to final causes or to future good
must be from something prior to the world, for any other supposition
carries in it a contradiction. To suppose it is from the world itself
carries a contradiction. And to suppose that it is from nothing is a
contradiction, for it supposes that nothing carries in it some regard or
respect or relation to future good to be obtained, so as to govern in
the disposal of things in order to that good.
2. It shows that the
efficient cause of the world must be an intelligent voluntary agent, for
in the first place, by things being disposed to an end, something that
is future and that as yet has no actual being has influence and governs
in the effect that is produced. For the good that is the final cause as
yet is future. But this future thing that has no actual existence yet
has a present existence some way or other: otherwise it could have no
present influence in any effect at all. For that which in no respect
whatsoever is, can in no respect whatsoever have influence in an effect.
For it is a contradiction to suppose that that which absolutely and in
all respects is not, or is nothing, should have influence or causality,
or that mere nothing can do something. But there is no other way that
that which has no actual existence can have existence but only by having
existence in the understanding or in some idea. For instance, there is
no way that things that are first to begin to be the next year can be
now, before they begin to be, but by their being foreseen. Therefore, if
any cause be now seen acting with evident respect to something that is
first to begin to be the next year, so as that its effects shall be
disposed in order to it, and the production of that future thing governs
in the ordering and disposal of the effect, it argues that that cause is
intelligent and that he foresees that future thing, or that it exists
already in his idea just as much as if he foretold it. To foretell an
event to come is to hold forth those things that are signs conformed to
the future event, and by their conformity manifestly show that that
future event is present with the efficient of those signs, and that
there is an aim or respect of the efficient to the event in directing
and ordering and designing those things wherein the sign consists, in
conformity to the event signified, and for an end, viz., to signify or
give notice of that future event. There is nothing in foretelling
events, however particularly or exactly, that manifests intelligence and
design any other ways than these two: viz., First. Conforming things
present viz., sounds or marks, to things future, and Second. Doing that
with a certain design, viz., giving notice. But there is the very same
evidence of an intelligent and voluntary agent in ordering and disposing
things in conformity to future events, as words, as much in conforming
other things, as sounds or marks. Things are so disposed to future ends,
so perfectly ordered to bring about such and such necessary and good
ends, that there is, as it were, as exact and perfect a conformity, or
rather correspondence, between the means and the end as there is between
a stamp and the picture that is designed to be stamped with it, or as
there is in the types in the press and the impression intended by it, or
as there is between the letters and their combinations on paper and the
words that are intended should be spoken by him that shall read them.
We may as well and as
reasonably suppose that words, yea, a great multitude of them, may be in
exact and precise conformity, in innumerable particulars, to something
future without understanding, as that a great multitude of things shall
be in as exact and particular conformity to future events without
understanding. There are two things in foretelling future events that
argue intelligence, viz., conformity to something future and design or
aim at an end. And there is the same in directing or ordering things for
future good or for final causes.
If a cause may conform and direct effects to final causes without
understanding, as if it had exceeding great understanding, then there is
nothing that we expect of intelligent beings but what we may expect from
such an unintelligent cause. For there is nothing whatsoever that we
look upon as a sign or mark of intelligence in any being but it is in
thus directing and ordering things for final causes. For we can see no
signs of intelligence in any but these three, viz., First. That he acts
and produces effects. Second. That in acting or producing effects, he
shows that things not present in their actual existence are yet some way
present with him, as in idea, by a conformity of his acts to things
distant or future, as it is in one that conceives of things distant and
future. Third. That he acts with design, as aiming at that which is
future. But he that evidently acts for final causes does all these
things. If a cause without understanding can do all these things, then
we may expect that he will do all the acts that intelligent beings do in
as great perfection as they, viz., determine between good and bad,
reward, punish, instruct, counsel, comfort, give answers, and converse.
For all that, in any or all of these things, argues intelligence is a
conformity of actions to things absent or future as if present in idea,
and acting with design or ends. And though the designs or ends in such a
way of acting is exceeding various or manifold, yet the multiplicity and
variety of ends argues intelligence no otherwise than as it the more
plainly manifests that there is indeed a presence of things absent, as
in idea, and that there is indeed an ordering of effects for final
causes, as in design. But this is not the thing now in question. But the
question is, Whether or no, if it be granted that future things are
manifestly so present as if in idea, and they are indeed so ordered for
final causes, it argues intelligence? Not but that there is as great an
evidence of real intelligence and design in God’s works of creation and
providence by multiplicity and variety of good ends evidently aimed at,
as there can be in conversing as intelligent beings do.
In an efficient cause disposing things for a final cause, it appears
that things not actually in being are present with it, but present with
it so as to determine it in acting, just as intelligent beings are
determined by choice, and by a wise choice rejecting the bad and
choosing the good (and choosing the good with admirable distinction,
choosing the best in millions of cases) out of an infinite variety that
are equally possible and equally before this cause. It argues perception
in the cause that thus selects the best out of infinite numbers in all
cases, because it is good that governs the determination of this cause,
but things are neither good nor bad but only with relation to
perception. There is no other way that a being can exist before its
actual proper existence but only by existing in some representation. For
if the thing itself is not, nor anything that represents it, then surely
it is not at all or in any wise. But there is no representation present
with an efficient to make that aim at the thing, represented, as that
for which he effects, but an idea — no other representation but a
perceived representation. The representation of the future thing aimed
at by the first cause is no otherwise present with that first cause,
before actual existence, than all other possible beings not actually
existing. But only that is selected by the first cause, out of all other
possible things, for its goodness, which argues that the first cause
perceives the goodness. For goodness has no existence but with relation
to perception.
Why should there be a
backwardness in us to conceive of this first cause of things as a
properly intelligent and voluntary agent, or why should we look upon it
as a strange thing that it should be so? Is it because it is a strange
thing that there should be any intelligent and voluntary beings at all?
If it be so, it argues against the first cause being such a being no
otherwise than it argues against there being any such being at all. And
if it ben’t forceable against the existence of any such being, then it
is not against the first cause being such a being. But we know that
there are intelligent and voluntary beings, and that more certainly than
we know the existence of any other kind of being, because we know it by
our own immediate consciousness. And we that are intelligent and
voluntary beings, are the effects of this first cause. It is it that has
made us and made us intelligent beings. And why is it more strange that
the cause should be intelligent than the effect? Why should it appear
strange that the intelligent creatures that it has made are more in his
image than any other effects that it has made? We see they are so in its
image in all other things far more than any unperceiving beings. They
are so in the manner of their acting. The first cause acts from himself,
so these act more from themselves than any other beings. The first cause
acts for final causes, so do these his creatures and these only. The
first cause is chief of all beings, and these intelligent beings that he
has made are chief among creatures and so in his image in that respect.
And they are next to the first cause, and it is more likely that those
effects of the first cause that are nearest to it should be most like
it. These intelligent creatures are evidently set over the rest. The
rest are put more in subjection to them than to any other and more in
their power. In this respect they bear the image of the first cause who
has all things under it and in its power.
We have all reason to
think that this first cause of all things, that is the cause of all
perception and intelligence in the world, is not only not an
unintelligent, unknowing, and insensible being, but that he is
infinitely the most intelligent and sensible being of all; that he is
more perceiving than any; that his perception is so much more sensible
and lively and perfect; that created minds are, in comparison of him,
like dead, senseless, unperceiving substances; and that he infinitely
more exceeds them in the sensibility and life and height (if I may so
speak) of his perception than the sun exceeds the planets in the
intensive degree of his brightness, as well as the bulk or extent of his
shining disk. And as he is more sensible, so he is, as I may express it,
more voluntary than created minds. He acts more of himself, infinitely
more purely active, and in no respect passive as all created minds are
in a great measure passive in their acts of will. And the acts of will
are more voluntary. Though there be no proper passions, as in created
minds, yet voluntariness is exercised to an infinitely greater height.
The divine love, which is the sum of all the exercises of the divine
will, is infinitely stronger, more lively, and intense, as not only the
light of the sun but his heat is immensely greater than that of the
planets whose light and heat is derived from him.
880. Being of God. Concerning the external existence. Concerning
that objection against the form of the argument from the order and final
causes of things, to prove the being of a God, viz., that this order
might happen in an infinite number of changes of the fortuitous
positions of the parts of the matter that the universe is composed of,
in their endless wanderings in infinite space. To this it may be
answered:
1. That matter could not
be from eternity of itself without any cause, having no necessary
existence or there being no reason, without supposing an efficient
cause, why matter should have existence. It is absurd to suppose that
anything is and there is absolutely no reason why it is. When there are
two parts of a disjunction, one of them will not be and not the other,
unless there be some reason why one should be rather than the other.
There must be something to preponderate with respect to that part of the
disjunction that has prevailed. If one scale of a balance descends and
the other ascends, it is a sure evidence that there is a preponderation.
There is a reason to be given why God should have a being. The reason is
because there is no other way. There is nothing else supposable to be
put with the being of God as the other part of the disjunction. If there
be, it is absolute and universal nothing. A supposition of something is
a supposition of the being of God. It does not only presuppose it but it
implies it. It implies it not only consequently but immediately. God is
the sum of all being and there is no being without his being. All things
are in him, and he in all. But there is no such thing supposable as an
absolute universal nothing. We talk nonsense when we suppose any such
thing. We deceive ourselves when we think we do in our minds suppose it,
or when we imagine we suppose it to be possible. What we do when we go
to think of absolute nihility (if I may so speak) is only to remove one
thing to make way for and suppose another. In this case there is no such
thing as two parts of a disjunction. When we are come to being in
general we are come to one single point without a disjunction.
Therefore, God is, because there is no other way. God is, because there
is nothing else to make a supposition of.
But we know that it is not
so with respect to the matter of which the universe is composed. If
nothing else can be supposed but the existence of such matter as we find
in some places, then why is it not everywhere alike? If this matter can
be supposed not to be in such a part of space, then surely it is in the
nature of things supposable that it should not be in other parts of
space. It is not in itself necessary that there should be matter in
other places more than in this place which is empty. If it be in itself
necessary that matter should be, why is there no more of it? There is
room for a great deal more. Or why is there so much: why is there not
less? Surely here is a supposable disjunction: so much or not so much,
or so much and more. You have room for infinite different sorts of a
disjunction or distribution, all equally supposable, viz., infinite
different quantities of matter of which there is no more reason in the
thing itself that any one should be rather than any other. Therefore, to
suppose that one certain particular of all this infinite number should
be and all the rest not be, without any disposing cause, is infinitely
absurd. Again, why should the matter that there is be so disposed of as
to occupy just such particular parts of space in such a situation and
not be disposed in any of the other infinite manners equally supposable?
Here again is one particular of an infinite number of particulars,
equally supposable, which cannot be without a reason.
By these things it appears that matter is not a thing of necessary
existence. Therefore, if matter exists, it exists accidentally without
any reason at all, which is absurd. It is absurd to suppose one atom of
matter to exist accidentally, to have being and there be no cause for
it. Therefore, the absurdity seems to appear still greater that there
should be so many millions, such an infinite number of such causeless
existences. What we see often come to pass we are more ready to think
there is some cause for, than what happens but once.
Again, 2. The objection
supposes not only that the matter of which the universe consists could
have being from eternity without any cause, but also that it could be in
motion from eternity without a cause, which is more palpably absurd. The
objection supposes that the numberless parts of matter were in motion
from eternity and so have been subject to endless changes in their
situation with respect one to another. But it may justly be inquired,
What set them in motion, or what caused them to move rather than to
stand still? When we see an arrow or a stone flying through the air we
conclude, yea we know, that there must be some cause of its motion, and
some cause why it flies in such a direction and so swiftly and at such a
time. It is plain that the being of matter is not necessary but that the
contrary, viz., its not being, is a thing supposable. But it is more
plain and manifest to everyone, with less reflection, that it is not
necessary that matter should be in motion, that it may be supposed to be
still. And it is more palpably manifest still that it is not necessary
that matter should move in such a direction and with such a degree of
velocity. It is self-evident that matter in itself is indifferent to an
infinite number of directions. And therefore, when we see matter
actually determined to one particular direction and proceeding on one
path out of all the rest of that infinity of paths, it is certain that
it is not absolute perfect indifference that thus determines it to one
rather than all the rest, but some determining cause. And so it is as
plain that matter, if it moves, is in itself no more disposed to move in
the degree of velocity that it has than in infinite numbers of other
degrees. And therefore there is some cause why it moves in such a degree
of velocity.
The unreasonableness of
supposing matter and motion (which are not necessary existences) to be
from eternity without any cause has been illustrated by the similitude
of a chain hung up or hanging down from an infinite height, and we
observed the last link was suspended in the air without falling down. We
argue that this must be the effect of some cause. The supporting of that
link is not of the link itself. For supposing gravity be the nature of
the link, then we know that supporting the link is something added
besides what is in the link itself, and therefore it must be from some
other cause. Now it does not satisfy to say that the preceeding link is
the cause of this effect on that, and the next the cause of the support
of that, and so on, in infinitum. For still a cause is justly demanded
of this effect in the whole infinite chain which has not this effect in
itself, because the whole is supposed to have gravity in itself, which
is a tendency to descend. The case is exactly parallel, because it is
not a thing in dispute whether things that now are or are existing in
any part of the infinite extension of things exist of themselves or need
a cause as much as the suspension of any one of the links of the chain,
for by supposition they both need a cause. For instance, the existence
of the present generation of men needs a cause just as much as the
suspension of the last link of the chain. For it is not a thing now in
dispute whether a generation of men come into being of themselves. And
therefore the ascribing the suspension of the last link to the
suspension of the foregoing, and this on the next, and so on in
infinitum, is just so sufficient to account for the suspension of the
whole as to ascribe the existence of the present generation to the
preceding, and of that to the preceding, and so on, is to account for
the existence of the whole infinite succession. Or it is just the same
thing as if (supposing all things by gravitation tended in the same
direction) it should be asked what holds up the earth, and it should be
answered that it lay on something else, and that on something, and so in
infinitum. And yet all those things that lie one upon another by
gravitation tend to sink one from under another. And it’s still the same
thing if we should suppose the body of the earth to be heaved up
contrary to its supposed tendency by gravitation, and it should be
solved in the same manner, viz., that it was lifted by something under
it, and that by something under that, and so in infinitum. For the
holding it up, contrary to its natural tendency, is an effect that needs
a cause as much as moving it contrary to its natural tendency. The
latter is only the like effect (viz., opposing the natural tendency of
the earth) to a further degree. Yea, the atheists do actually solve the
existence of the motion of bodies that is observed in the world this
very way. For they suppose it is to be accounted for thus: that one body
moved another by percussion, and that, another, and so in infinitum. And
that so the present motion that is observed in the bodies of the
universe is to be accounted for, though there be no reason in the nature
of things as they are in themselves why they should move and not be at
rest or, if they do move, why they should move in these and those
directions and with such degrees of velocity and not in any other of the
infinite number of directions or degrees of velocity equally possible.
Now therefore let us a
little more particularly consider how unreasonable this is. If there was
a row of perfectly elastic bodies of infinite length, and at last at a
certain moment that next to us, though till then it had always been at
rest, move and of a sudden start forward out of its place, we should
conclude that this could not be without a cause. And would it at all
satisfy anyone to say that the next to it moved and struck against that,
and the preceding struck against that, and so in infinitum? The case is
the same if we should suppose a chain infinitely long that had, till
this moment, always remained at rest, but now we observe the link next
to us starts out of its place, and the reason ascribed should be that
the last link was drawn and put in motion by the next, and that by the
next, and so in infinitum. And still the case is the same if we should
suppose a solid cylinder infinitely long, with one end near to us but
protracted to an infinite length from us, and we observe that the end
next to us on a sudden moves forward, and it should be asked, what was
the cause, and answer should be made that the parts next adjoining to it
moved and moved that, and the parts next to that moved that, and so in
infinitum. But would it not be reasonable in such a case to ask why the
whole moved? And so we should have this reason to conclude that the
cylinder had some cause of its motion without itself — that it moved
only just at such a moment when there was no more reason in itself that
it should move than at any other moment when it was at rest. So it is
with respect to an infinite row of bodies: there is no more reason that
the motion of the row should be so ordered as to set that next to us in
motion just at this moment rather than any other moment. If we should
see such a cylinder infinitely long, as we supposed, thus of a sudden
put in motion, would not such a motion as plainly show a cause without
itself as if we saw a cylinder of a finite length or a short one of two
feet long, after it had been at rest, suddenly to start out of its
place? By which it appears that it is just so unreasonable to suppose an
infinite succession of beings, not existing of themselves, to be without
an efficient cause without themselves, as a finite succession.
What we observed just now
of the unreasonableness of supposing an infinite row of bodies striking
one against another and setting one another in motion without any
external cause is applicable, with an exact parity of reason, to a
circular row of bodies in motion by percussion — of one of these bodies
be observed to move, and it should be inquired why it did so, and it
should be said it was moved by the next, and that by the next, and so
moved round in infinitum. And the case is still the same if we should
suppose one single body in motion from eternity with a particular
direction and degree of velocity, and it should be asked why that body
was thus moved, and it should be answered that its motion this moment
was caused by the motion it had the last moment, and that by the motion
it had the preceding moment, and so in infinitum.
The absurdity of an
infinite procession of beings having existence without any external
cause, by having it one from another when yet no one of them could have
it of themselves, or have it by any necessity or reason in the nature of
things in themselves considered, will further appear by this: Supposing
there had existed an eternal succession of generations of blind men, and
the present generation were able to tell the number, magnitude, and
position of the stars, and it should be inquired how they came by this
knowledge which no one could have of themselves because they were all
blind and so all insufficient for such knowledge of themselves, and it
should be answered that the present generation were instructed in it by
the foregoing, and they had it from the preceding, and so on in
infinitum. This is very absurd and foolish and the only reason why it is
so is this: because here it is supposed that those successive
generations of men are possessed of something that is transmitted from
one to another which no one of all the infinite succession are
sufficient to obtain of themselves, and yet that they have it without
communication from any cause that is sufficient to have it of himself.
The case is just the same with respect to existence of this eternal
succession of generations of men as it is with respect to this
knowledge. For by the supposition no one generation has in itself more
sufficiency to obtain existence than a blind man has to obtain that
knowledge of himself. Nor is there anything more in the nature of things
to direct, or determine, or make necessary such an effect as the
existence of such a generation of men than there is to direct and
determine such an effect as blind men’s having such ideas. And therefore
there is as much necessity that their existence, which is not at all
necessary, should have some cause without the whole succession as that
such knowledge should have a cause without the whole succession of
generations of blind men.
An infinite succession of
dependent beings do not only require an external efficiency as much as a
finite succession of beings, or a number of beings existing without
succession, but it requires a much greater efficacy. For the whole
effect, whether it be eternal or a temporary beginning, is dependent on
an external efficiency, and the greater the effect is the greater
efficiency does it require to produce it. Thus to hold up an infinite
chain is required infinitely greater efficiency than to hold up a finite
one, so to move a cylinder of infinite length, and so in the supposition
of an infinite succession of beings that give existence one to another.
The farther we go back, the greater efficiency is required in the cause
to give being such an existence and power as that they shall have power
to produce others, with power to produce others like them, and so on.
3. If we suppose that both
matter and motion might possibly have been from eternity of themselves,
yet that will not help the objection that is made against the force of
the argument from the order and final causes of things to prove the
being of a God. The objection supposes that this order and regularity
that is found in the creation may well enough be supposed to happen
without any designing, contriving cause once in a whole eternity, in an
infinite number of changes of the fortuitous positions of the parts of
the matter that the universe is composed of in their endless wanderings
in infinite space; and that as it is supposable that the various parts
of matter, having so much room or opportunity as there is in an infinite
duration to change their situations and come into an infinite number of
various forms and contextures, that it is not unreasonable to suppose
that they might of themselves jostle into that beautiful, convenient
order and wonderful contexture in which they now are, so as to produce
such a general frame of the universe: — The heavenly bodies to such
forms, in such a system, with such proportion, such motions, and with
such properties, and so particularly with those wonderful phenomena of
such a mutual regular attraction by some strange, unsearchable
mechanism, and such a wonderful thing as the light, with all that is
observed of its properties, powers, and effects, and all that belongs to
the particular planets, and this earth in particular with its various
elements of earth, air, and water, with all their convenient
dispositions and phenomena; and also all that belongs to the smaller
systems that are the particular parts of the greater and more general
systems, such as the bodies of man and the other innumerable kinds of
animals, great and small, visible to the naked eye and discernible by
the microscope; with the infinite number of vegetables, with such a
mechanism or wonderful disposition as that all of them have a power to
propagate their species to endless ages. The objection supposes that it
is not unreasonable to suppose that the various parts of matter
fortuitously existing and fortuitously moving might, in infinite
duration, of themselves, without any designing or contriving cause,
jumble into such a contexture as this. Not but that it would be very
unreasonable to suppose that this should come to pass of itself in a
short space of time, but the whole weight of the objection is laid on
the infinity of the room or opportunity there is for parts of matter to
wander in and come into an infinite variety of positions and
contextures.
But if we thoroughly
consider the matter, it will appear that whether we suppose an infinite
duration or never so short an opportunity, it is very much the same
thing as to the present argument. The supposed infinite duration will
make but infinitely little difference as to the probability of such an
event as the various parts of matter coming of themselves into such an
infinitely regular, beautiful, and convenient frame. The difference is
so small that it is as nothing, and really worthy of no consideration.
And to avoid absurdity and
repeated circumlocutions I would explain in what sense I use the word
‘particle’ in what follows. Hereby I intend the least parcel of matter
that is of such a quantity as that its particular position or situation
is of any consequence in the frame and system of things, so that its
being placed so or otherwise should make some difference worthy to be
regarded with respect to the regularity, conveniency, or excellency of
the frame, either the general frame or the particular parts in which
regularity is in fact observed, as in the bodies of animals, vegetables,
etc. Or, in other words, by particle I mean the particular parcels or
quantities of matter whose particular and exact positions are actually
that wherein that regularity, beauty, and convenience of the frame and
composition of the universe that are observed does partly consist, or on
which the good ends, that we see are obtained by its disposition and
contexture, do partly depend.
Having explained the sense
in which I would in this place use the word ‘particle,’ I proceed to
observe:
1. If we suppose but two
particles in all, and there were some certain positions or distances one
from another that was more convenient than any other, supposing that
convenient distance to be the length of ten of both their diameters, and
suppose, moreover, these two particles from all eternity to be confined
to one certain right line of an infinite length, supposing these
particles could exist without a cause, and supposing also that they
could have motion without a cause, it would be an infinite number to one
whether these two particles would lie in that most convenient situation
at this time — because there is but one convenient distance and an
infinite number of other possible distances in that infinite line, and
it is at least a thing as likely never to have been as to have been that
these two particles should ever have come to this convenient situation
at all at any time throughout all the past eternity. For it is manifest
that the whole line that is infinitely extended both ways, and without
any beginning or any end, is a length in extension that is equivalent to
eternity, that is, an infinite length of duration that is infinitely
extended both ways and without beginning or end. And one part of that
line taken from any particular point and extended infinitely but one way
is a length that proceeds to eternity in parte ante, or past eternity.
An eternal duration is an infinite length of single points of duration,
joined together and following one another, extended to an infinite
length in a manner equivalent to the single points following one another
in a right line of infinite length. Now if we should suppose that the
two particles that exist in that right line that is infinite both ways
might probably, at some moment in the whole infinite duration from
eternity to eternity, come into that proposed convenient situation
(because in such a duration the two particles might come into all
possible situations in that right line, there being as many moments in
that infinite duration as there are different parts, and so of
situations and distances in that infinite line), if we allow it to be
thus more likely than not that, in all eternity without beginning or
end, those two particles might come once into that convenient situation,
yet if we take but half this duration, viz., only eternity a parte ante,
we must suppose the probability not to be more than half so great, and
consequently that, at most, the probability of their ever coming into
this situation is more than ever equal to that of their not coming into
it. Or, in other words, the probability of the affirmative is to that of
the negative no more than one to one. (N.B. It alters not the case as to
what has been asserted whether we suppose these particles of matter in
their motions to observe the laws of motion that now appear to be
observed in the universe, and so to move in the same direction
perpetually, or no. For if this be supposed, it is at best as probable
that these two particles that move in this right line should from
eternity move from one another as towards one another, and so still the
probability of their never coming into a convenient propinquity is at
best as great as the affirmative — as was said before, as one to one.
Yet it must be more than so, for the chance is one to one whether the
particles will move at all or no, for matter in itself is indifferent to
motion or rest, and, if so, the probability of their not coming into the
convenient situation is as two to one: but to avoid all occasion for
disputes we will suppose it to be as one to one.)
2. Supposing those two
particles not to be confined to any certain infinite line but to a
certain infinite plane, the probability then is infinitely less than
ever those two particles would come into that convenient situation,
because an infinite plane contains an infinite number of such lines, as
many such lines as that infinite line did points, so that, as before the
probability was to the improbability as one to one, so now it is an
infinite number to one. Or in other words, though we allow an infinite
duration for those two particles to move and wander and change distance,
yet confining them to one certain plane it would be infinitely unlikely
that ever they should come at all, throughout a whole eternity, into
that most convenient distance one from another, or infinitely more
likely that they should not, than that they should.
3. Let us suppose these
two particles not to be confined either to any certain line or plane,
but to have the whole infinite solid to wander in. Then it is infinitely
more improbable still that ever they would come throughout eternity once
into that convenient situation, because there are an infinite number of
infinite planes in an infinite solid, as there are an infinite number of
infinite lines in an infinite plane, and an infinite number of points in
an infinite line. So that now the degree of improbability of the
convenient situation ever happening throughout eternity, beyond the
chance there is that ever it would happen, is expressed by an infinite
number multiplied by an infinite number to one.
And now if instead of two
particles we add a third, and the thing required be that these three
come at once into a convenient situation one with another, as that the
former two should at some time or other come into that convenient
distance before spoken of, and also that this third do, at the same
time, be so posited with them as to form such a certain convenient
figure as, suppose, an equicrural triangle having one right angle, all
these having an infinite solid extension to wander in — this will most
prodigiously increase the account and magnify the improbability. For let
us suppose the two first particles fixed at their due distances as
though each were fastened at the two ends of a rod of a proper length
and so to remain fixed throughout eternity waiting for the third to come
into its proper point or proper situation with respect to them. Then the
remaining thing required is equivalent to the third particle’s coming
into a certain individual point in infinite space. And that chance is
just the same whether we suppose the point be fixed or moving, because
just so much advantage as is gained by its being movable in one way is
lost another. The advantage gained is that the points, being movable,
may move towards the particle and meet it. But on the contrary, if in
its motion it should happen to fly from it, there would be as great a
disadvantage. But its motion is just so likely to be from, so as to
increase the distance, as towards it so as to approach nearer to it. So
that it appears that the coming of the third particle into a due
position with the other two that remained fixed at the same distance one
from another is equivalent to this third particle’s coming into a
certain and fixed point in infinite space. But the improbability that
lies against that is to the probability there is for it (as appears by
what has already been said) as an infinite number multiplied by an
infinite, twice over. For if it were confined to a certain plane that
had that fixed point in it, it would be as one infinite number to one.
But if it were wandering at liberty in an infinite solid, it is as an
infinite number multiplied by an infinite number to one that expresses
the improbability of the third particle coming into its due position
with them, supposing the others to be fixed at a due position one with
another throughout eternity. But if the other two come into their due
position but at one point of time in an eternity (supposing that it be
certain that it would be once), it is still infinitely more unlikely
that the third should come into its due position with them at that
individual point of time than if they were so tied together through all
eternity, because a whole eternity includes an infinite number of points
of time. So that now, upon this supposition, the improbability is
expressed as an infinite number multiplied by an infinite number and the
product again multiplied by an infinite number to one. Thus the matter
would stand on the supposition that it was certain that the two first
particles would, some time in eternity, come into their due position one
with respect to another. But it has been shown that that is so far from
being certain that the degree of improbability of it is expressed by an
infinite number of infinite numbers to one, which improbability, if
added to the foregoing, it makes still so many more times improbable. So
that now the degree of the whole improbability of the three particles
ever coming into such a position as to form such an equicrural triangle
as has been mentioned is increased by an infinite number of infinite
numbers multiplied again by an infinite number, and that again by an
infinite number, and this last product still by another infinite — so
unlikely is it that but only three particles would ever come into so
simple a regularity as this fortuitously, though there should be an
whole eternity of opportunity f or it.
It appears, from what has been observed, that the eternity of
opportunity makes so little part as to the probability of but three
particles coming into so simple a regularity as that of a certain kind
of equicrural triangle, that the addition of one single particle to the
frame does infinitely more than overbalance it. The improbability of the
regular position of the two particles with an eternity of opportunity,
as was before observed, is expressed by an infinite once multiplied by
an infinite to one. But if we suppose there had been no eternity of
opportunity and but one single moment, the opportunity would have been
infinitely less still, so that then the improbability would be so added
to, that infinites must be multiplied by infinites twice instead of
once. But the addition of another particle makes an infinitely greater
odds than this, for by this means, instead of multiplying infinite by
infinite thrice the multiplication must be made four times.
And in this manner does the system’s becoming more complex increase the
improbability. The addition of every single particle that goes to the
making up of the regularity or convenience of the system increases the
improbability so much that the increase of it is not expressed by
multiplying the improbability by an infinite number three times, but by
multiplying the improbability by an infinite number, and that product by
another infinite, and that product by another infinite. To illustrate
this by adding a fourth particle to the three forementioned: I have
already showed, if there were but three particles, how great the
improbability would be that ever they should come into such a situation
one with respect to another as to form a right-angled equicrural
triangle. We will now suppose there to be four particles in all, and the
thing required be that they should come into such a situation, one with
respect to another, as to form an exact square of such a bigness that
each of the sides should be equal to the two equal sides of the
forementioned equicrural triangle, or (which is the same thing) the
thing required is that the three first particles should come at the same
moment into the forementioned situation of an equicrural triangle, and
also that the fourth should come into that individual point that makes
the fourth angle of the square with these three, and also at that
individual moment wherein the other three come into their requisite
situation. And in order to judge how great the improbability of all this
is, we must in the first place consider how great the improbability is
that the three first particles should ever come into their requisite
situation of such an equicrural triangle, which is necessary in order to
there being any such point as the fourth angle of a square with them.
But the degree of that improbability we have considered already and
shown it to be expressed by the proportion of the product of an infinite
number multiplied into itself three times to an unit. This is the degree
of improbability of there ever being any such point given as the fourth
angle required. But now if we suppose there to be such a point given at
some moment in eternity, the additional improbability is of the fourth
particle’s coming into that point at that individual moment. If the
point was fixed and unmoved, waiting through eternity, it appears by
what has already been demonstrated it would be an infinite number
multiplied by an infinite number to one whether ever it would come into
any fixed individual point at any time through eternity. But as the
point is supposed to be given but one moment in eternity, this makes it
yet infinitely more improbable. So that the improbability of the fourth
particle’s coming into that point at the right time is expressed by an
infinite number (which multiplies the preceding), and this multiplied by
an infinite number, and that product by an infinite number. And this is
the addition of the improbability of the whole system. The preceding
improbability is expressed by an infinite X infinite X infinite X
infinite X infinite, and the additional improbability is first an
infinite, which we must conceive of as multiplying the preceding product
and then this multiplied by infinite, and this still by infinite so that
the whole degree of improbability of the four particles ever happening
to be so situated as to make the requisite square at any one time
through eternity is expressed by an infinite number X infinite X
infinite X infinite X infinite X infinite X infinite X infinite X
infinite to one.
And in like manner the
improbability would be increased if we should go on and to the four
particles should suppose a fifth to be added at some certain point
requisite to make out the regularity, suppose in the center of the
square. It will easily appear that the improbability will be increased
by multiplying of it by infinites a like number of times. So that the
improbability of five particles coming into this or any other
determinant regular system, though there be an eternity of opportunity,
or the probability of the contrary, is expressed by an infinite number X
infinite X infinite X infinite X infinite X infinite X infinite X
infinite X infinite X infinite X infinite.
If there be so great an
improbability of a regular system so simple, consisting of but five
parts, ever coming into existence through the fortuitous wandering of
the parts in infinite space, though there be an eternity of opportunity
given for it, then how great would be the improbability of so many
millions of different parts of matter as must be supposed in so complex
a frame as that of an animalcule coming of themselves, or by mere
accident, into a situation of such marvelous exactness of contrivance
and regularity and such wonderful mechanism, as not only to perform all
those functions of life that are performed, but also (which the atheists
must suppose) so as to have a power through the mechanism to make other
forms like itself, still with a power to make others like them, and so
on through thousands of generations? And how great then is the
improbability of the whole frame of the universe — its coming into such
a regularity as it exists in, containing so many myriads of millions of
millions of millions of such animal bodies and also as many if not more
bodies of plants, with all that mechanism whence arises all those
phenomena that are seen in them, and particularly the like power of
producing the species through thousands of generations as in animals,
and also many millions of such frames of matter (as the atheists
suppose) so curious as to have a power of understanding, remembering,
refining, and contriving and performing all the intelligent operations
of mankind, with a power of producing the like frames from generation to
generation for so many thousand years? Besides, the frame of the world
about them every way so wonderfully fitted for their habitation and use,
with such a variety of substances, earth, water, air, fire, light, and
innumerable others, some of which are of such wonderful form, power, and
use, as the water, air, and many others (and especially the use) and all
disposed in such a manner, in such parts, situations, and with such
motions so excellently insuring all ends — I say how unreasonable will
it appear, from what has been observed, to suppose that all this came to
pass fortuitously, by mere chance, without any contriving, disposing
cause?
It appears from what has been said that the parts of matter wandering in
infinite space being supposed to have an eternity of opportunity to get
into this regularity makes no odds of any moment or worthy of any
consideration as to the improbability of such an event’s ever coming to
pass, or the unreasonableness of supposing it any more than if we
suppose the opportunity only of a single moment. For it has been
demonstrated from things that have been observed that the addition of
the minutest particle that goes to the making up the complex frame adds
infinitely more to the improbability than an eternity of opportunity
diminishes it. So that, if we only suppose the whole frame to be less
complex by one single particle than it is, then the infinite opportunity
that is in eternity is balanced, and infinitely more than balanced; and
it is infinitely less likely that the whole frame, taking in that single
particle, should ever exist with an eternity of opportunity than that
the frame without that one single particle, as being less complex by one
particle, should come into existence with but a single moment’s
opportunity. Surely, therefore, the difference that is made in the
improbability of the existence of the frame of the universe through a
casual concourse of particles by supposing an eternity of opportunity is
absolutely of no moment, and worthy of no consideration in the argument
between us and atheists.
We have supposed, hitherto, that all the particles that have any
existence throughout the whole of infinite space do go to make up the
frame of the universe. But if we suppose a surplusage of particles, it
will not help the cause of the atheist; for if the supposition of a
surplusage of particles seems to give a better chance for such a regular
frame to come accidentally into existence through a fortuitous jumbling
of particles, and so to lessen the improbability one way, yet it seems
as much to increase it another. For let us suppose that, besides the
particles that belong to the frame of this universe, the whole of
infinite space is possessed by particles as thick, take one part of
space with another, as they are in this universe, or that it has as many
particles at all parts of space equal to the extent of this universe,
take one part with another, as there are particles in the universe, then
these two things must come to pass by mere accident: 1. That all those
particles of which the universe is constituted should come into such a
regular and exact situation as to constitute such a wonderful,
infinitely complex, and exact frame as this, and 2. That all the other
particles that fill space in general as full as this universe is, all
particles that are unserviceable and are not needed to make up the
frame, should agree to absent themselves and keep at a distance, to
leave so vast a vacuity for the regular frame, and none of them
interpose so as to hinder the regularity and beauty and disturb the
order of the parts, so that so vast a room should be left and avoided by
all irregular particles as much as if they were fenced out — and that
although other parts of space, take one with another, are as full of
particles as that universe is which has such an immense and, as it were,
infinite multitude. And if we suppose there to be a surplusage of
particles, but not so many as to fill up space in general so full as
this universe is, but elsewhere to be very thin and so therein to be
less likely to interpose to disturb the order of this regular frame, it
is to be considered that, as on that supposition the probability of
disturbing the frame is diminished, so the probability of their helping
it by their numbers is as much diminished. So that, whether we suppose
the particles to be thick or rare, it comes to the same thing. The
thicker they are the less likely it is that they would leave such vast
room to be occupied only by regular particles and the more likely to
thrust themselves among those that are regularly situated one with
respect to another. And the thinner or more rare they are, the less do
they, through their multitude, help the chance for the existence of a
regular situation of some particles or others. Thick particles, jumbling
together without any direction, in some respects tend more to confusion
than if they were very rare, as they tend more to intrude and so to
disturb and break any regularity that might happen. A multitude of
particles, all without rule or direction, tend more to interfere with
any regularity of frame, that they are conjoined with or encompass, than
a small number.
It is to be considered
that the universe is one vast general frame consisting of an innumerable
multitude of lesser regular frames. There is a multitude of particular
regular frames that constitute the body of an animal — as the frame of
the eye, the ear, the lungs, the heart, etc.; and so it also is with the
body of a plant — the root, the stem, the leaf, flower, fruit, and seed.
And then the innumerable multitude of bodies and plants and animals that
live upon earth go to constitute another more general frame, viz., the
animate world, and this goes to the constitution of another larger frame
together with the habitation provided for it and the many various
provisions made in it for their proper abode, life, preservation,
nourishment in growth, propagation, increase, motion, mutual
subserviency, and all the good they receive and use they are of through
the provision of a proper variety of substances and their proper
situation, composition, regular motions, and alterations — such as the
earth, water, air, wind, sea, springs, rivers, light, heat, cold,
vapors, dew, rain, day, night, summer, winter, etc. And the whole frame
of this terraqueous globe, with its atmosphere, is a part of another
regular frame, viz., the planetary system, and this of another made up
of innumerable enlightened systems, each from one fountain of light like
the sun, all posited at such a distance one from another as to enlighten
and advance one another, and yet not to disturb one another sensibly for
6,000 years.
Now the supposition of
infinite space being filled, in general thick with particles wandering
at random, though it may seem to lessen the improbability of such a
frame coming by chance one way, yet it exceedingly increases it another,
for this whole universe is no other than an immense multitude of
particular regular systems all with a convenient mutual vicinity and a
proper relation and exact situation and commensuration. But now the
supposition of infinite space being filled thick with particles all
moving without rule or direction does, in a way, vastly increase the
improbability of such a multitude of regular frames happening in such a
mutual neighborhood and relation. For if certain particles fall into a
due situation for one particular regular frame, it is the more likely
for the multitude of irregular particles about it that others will
interpose among those regularly situated particles to disturb and
destroy the harmony. And if there should, notwithstanding the multitude
of irregular busy wandering particles, happen to be two systems of
particles in a due regular situation, it is still the more likely that
other particles will interpose to disturb the order and mutual
subserviency, either by intruding among these regular particles or
interposing between the two frames: and if we suppose three systems,
still the probability is greatly increased.
But how great is the improbability that, in such an universe, numbers of
millions of millions of particles in very complex and wonderfully
regular frames, which the universe consists of, should all happen at
once fortuitously, in a proper and exact proportion and convenient
situation and relation, and none of the surplusage of particles with
which infinite space is filled should interfere or interpose to disturb
the harmony and subserviency, or obscure the beauty — and that although
the room be so vast and the opportunity so great?
So that the objection made
from the eternity of opportunity against the force of the argument from
the wonderful contrivance of the world to prove the being of a God is
but a mere amusement. Such order and contrivance plainly shows a
contriving and disposing cause and is a demonstration of intelligence
and wisdom, whether we suppose an eternity of existence of wandering
atoms or no. An infinite length of time has no tendency to alter the
case. If we should suppose people traveling in the snow, one after
another, thousands in a day for thousands of years together, and all
should tread exactly without the least variation in one another’s steps
so as, in all this time, to make no beaten path but only steps with the
snow not broken between, this is a demonstration of intention, design,
and care. Of if we suppose that, in the showers of rain that fall out of
the clouds on all the face of the earth for a whole year, the drops
should universally fall in order on the ground so as to describe such
figures that would be Roman letters in such exact order as to be
Vergil’s Aeneid written on every acre of ground all over the world, or
so as exactly to write the history of the world and all nations and
families in it through all ages without departing from truth in one fact
or minutest circumstance — that would distinctly demonstrate a designing
cause. Length of time has no tendency at all to produce such an effect
of itself. If we multiply years never so much to give large opportunity,
it helps not the case without a designing cause. It is no more likely to
bring about such a year’s rain as that than if we suppose the
opportunity of one year only.
And as that objection against the force of the argument for the being of
a God from the order and contrivance of the frame of the universe, viz.,
that there has been an eternity of opportunity for this to come to pass
in, of itself is vain and insignificant — so would it be as vain to say
that the world has existed in this regular, beautiful, and convenient
frame from eternity. For still continuance shows wisdom and
intelligence, and to say that the world exists in such a regular frame
because it did so always no more solves the difficulty of its being so
without wisdom and intelligence than if there were a blind man that had
lived from eternity, and always blind, that was able exactly to describe
visible things as if he saw, without ever having been informed as
particularly the number and diverse magnitude, position and motion of
the stars — and any should ask how he came to know this and it should be
answered that there never was a time when he came to know it, for he
knew it from eternity and never needed the information of his senses or
of his fellow creatures. This is a mere put off and in no wise removes
the difficulty, for seeing it is as necessary, in order to his knowing
it from eternity, as to his receiving the knowledge of it in time. So
the orderly, convenient, and excellent disposing of things in order to
obtain good ends is a thing that depends as much on knowledge and
understanding as the knowledge of visible things depends on sight, and
therefore the former can no more be from eternity without understanding
than the latter without sight.
976. Unity of God. Being
of God. Unity of the World. The uniformity, concord, and perfect harmony
which appears in the constitution and conservation of things, their
conspiring to one end, their continuing in the same order and course do
plainly declare the unity of God: as the lasting peace of a commonwealth
composed of persons different in affection and humor argues one law that
regulates and contains them, as the orderly march of an army shows it
managed by one conduct; as the uniformity of an house declares it
contrived by one architect. (Barrow’s Works, vol. 2, p. 96.) This is
most apparent concerning the solar, or our planetary, system. It is
plain, it is one system. We will therefore consider the union there is
in the whole visible universe or between the fixed stars. And first, I
will show wherein there is a manifest agreement between these distant
parts of the universe, whereby it is evident that there is oneness in
the cause of all. And secondly, I would take notice wherein these
distant systems are united one with another, whereby they all become one
great system.
I. I would observe wherein
there is a manifest and marvelous agreement in those distant parts of
the universe whereby it is evident that they agree in their cause. And
they do so agree in these following respects:
1. They agree in this,
that they all of them are, in comparison of the expanse of the heavens,
but little spots or specks separated one from another. Why should it so
happen concerning so many millions; and that there should appear no
other matter in the universe but what is thus collected? Why should it
not have happened as well that one side of the heavens should be all one
lurid body, the rest vacant; or one part of the heavens a continued
body, another full of spots; or here and there a continuity of matter,
and here and there a vacancy; here and there spots of many different
kinds, etc. — were it not for some common cause ordering it so that all
the bodies that should appear through the immense expanse of the
universe should be in such small, compact collections of matter?
2. They not only all agree
in this that they are all distinct, compact, and comparatively very
small bodies or little particles, but they are also all of them exactly
of the same figure, all round. Now whether we suppose that this is owing
to the mutual gravitation of their parts or not, it clearly, in either
supposition, argues the oneness of the efficient cause. Their being all
of a round figure is indeed most probably owing to the mutual
gravitation of their parts, for that is evidently the cause of the round
figure of all the heavenly bodies near us, as of the earth and all the
rest of the planets primary and secondary, and in the sun that is by far
the most like the fixed stars of any body near us. It is demonstrable
that a mutual gravitation of the parts of matter according to the
quantity of matter and the square of distance obtains on all these, and
the round figure in all of them appears evidently, in all of them, to be
the consequence of this. Therefore, seeing we behold the same effect,
the same round figure, in the many millions of heavenly bodies that are
far distant, there is all reason to conclude it to be from the same
cause. Now in this supposition that such a wondrous power or law should
take place everywhere through the whole universe and all the matter that
is contained in it in all the innumerable distant systems that are in
it, which power is demonstrably not from matter itself but from the
established law and continued power of the Creator: — I say this shows
the whole corporeal universe to be but one, and that all is created and
upheld and governed by the same first cause, and every moment under the
influence of the same divine power. But upon the other supposition that
no such law obtains in other parts of the universe but only in this
solar system, then the universal agreement of the many millions of fixed
stars in the same round figure is a clear argument of one common first
cause. For if there be no such internal cause or power belonging to the
nature of these bodies themselves that should, as it were, naturally
incline them to such a figure rather than any other, then it would be a
strange thing if any two of them should happen to be of the same figure.
For in themselves they must be supposed indifferent to all kinds of
possible figures, which are infinite, and therefore are as likely to be
in one of all those infinite figures as another. But much more strange
would it be that every one of such a vast multitude, not only that are
seen with the naked eye but the more and more that are discovered by
telescopes, should, without the exception of one, be exactly of the same
figure without a common cause.
3. Another remarkable
instance of their agreement is their all being perfectly at rest without
the least sensible motion or change of their situation from one thousand
years to another. Upon whatever supposition we go as the next or
immediate reason of this, yet such an agreement in so many millions of
such bodies will argue a common cause. If we suppose that the law of
gravitation holds throughout the universe, then this is a wonderful
thing that they do not run together by virtue of that mutual
gravitation, and must be owing to the law of some one common disposer,
whether it be by limiting that power and causing that it shall not take
place beyond such bounds, lest these distant bodies should disturb one
another, or otherwise. For if their gravitation does not reach one
another, it must be by an arbitrary limitation contrary to the laws of
gravitation in the respective systems. For the grand law is that every
part of matter should tend to every other part according to square of
distance, however vast the distance is, in proportion to the bigness of
those parts. Thus it is demonstrable that the countless parts of the
matter of this solar system tend to all other parts, however distant and
however small. Thus if we divide the two globes of the earth and sun
into never so small parts, parts never so many million times smaller
than rays of light, yet it is evident that each of these small parts in
the globe of the earth tends to each of these small parts in the globe
of the sun according to the square of distance, because it is evident by
experience that these two whole globes tend to each other according to
the quantity of matter and square of distance. But the whole matter of
both globes is made up of these small parts. But these small parts are
as far distant one from another, in proportion to their diameters, as
the fixed stars are. And the case is exactly the same between two fixed
stars as to their situation, proportion, and respect they have one to
another, as between two similar parts of this solar system whose
distance is in the same proportion to their diameters. But we see that
with respect to the one the law of gravitation holds, and if it does not
with regard to the other it must be by an arbitrary limiting and cutting
off this power at certain limits, contrary to the law that obtains
elsewhere, on design. And if there be this arbitrary designed limitation
of such a power everywhere at certain limits between so many millions of
heavenly bodies to prevent mutual disturbance, this shows a common
disposer, and that the whole is regulated by a common wisdom and a
common will and a common power that governs everywhere.
Gravitation is a power of
that nature that, unless it be arbitrarily limited in some places
contrary to its own laws that universally and immutably obtain in other
places, must extend itself infinitely, because we see that it in fact
does, in some places, extend itself infinitely in the solar system. For
the matter of the mutually attracting globes is infinitely divisible,
and therefore we may say that there are some parts of matter that are
infinitely small in proportion to the distance to which their attraction
is extended; but [i.e., for] that attraction may be looked upon as
infinitely extended that is extended to a distance that is infinite in
proportion to the bigness of the attracting body.
And furthermore, the rest
of the fixed stars, upon this supposition of their not being attracted
one by another, is a great evidence of the ordering of one common cause.
For all allow that matter in itself is indifferent to motion or rest,
yea, it is indifferent to rest or any of the infinitely various degrees
of motion. Hence, if there appeared but one body suspended in free space
in the midst of the expanse of the heavens, it would be a strange thing
if that should happen to be in a state of perfect rest. It would be an
infinite number to one whether it would or no, because it would be as
likely that it would be in either of the infinite number of degrees of
motion as at rest. So that a state of rest is to be reckoned but as one
state amongst an infinite number of other states to all which the body,
in itself, is indifferent and as likely to be in one of them as another.
Hence we see nothing in this world or system like every body’s being
suspended in free space yet remaining at rest, excepting the sun that is
one of the fixed stars. But how can we conceive of so many millions of
bodies suspended in the open expanse of the universe, and all of them so
fixed in their places that there shall be no sensible motion from one
thousand years to another, without the ordering of a voluntary, wise
disposer — and that everyone should agree in it — without one common
cause?
But upon the supposition that gravitation extends and obtains through
the whole universe, acting everywhere by the same laws that are
universally and invariably maintained (which is most likely), still the
rest of the fixed stars will be an evidence of one common cause that
disposes all. Or if we suppose that the fixed stars are placed at so
vast a distance one from another that their mutual attraction should
disturb them so little that their motion, occasioned hereby, should be
so small as not to be discerned by us at this distance in many thousand
years, such a disposal everywhere through the whole innumerable
multitude of those bodies shows a common care extending through the
whole as the cause. Or if we suppose, besides their great distance one
from another, such an artful disposal among them that their attractions
should balance one another so wonderfully as to, keep all in rest and
quietness (which is the most probable supposition of all), this still
more evidently and remarkably shows the care, influence, and government
of a common cause. Or if, lastly, we suppose these stars to be all fixed
in a solid sphere, that shows the universe all to be one building and
that it is one architect that has thus built such a bespangled arch or
roof to encompass this our system on every side.
4. Another thing wherein
they all agree is that they all shine by their own light with an
exceeding great and sparkling brightness and luster. Matter does not
seem in itself to have any great tendency to this. Here in our world we
see very few things that shine by their own light, and those that do, do
not shine with one ten-thousandth or millionth part of this brightness —
none of them. We see here very few bodies that will of themselves
enkindle and burn, and those that do continue so to do but a little
while before they go out. But we behold in the heavens, either with
naked eyes or glasses, many thousands and millions of bodies all alike
in this, all shining with their own light, and shining from age to age,
and all shining with a brightness like the light of the sun. This seems
to show a common cause.
5. Though there is so vast
a number of them and they are so vastly distant one from another, yet
all seem remarkably to agree in their internal nature, being replete
with a like kind of particles and all agreeing in the laws of the
intestine motion and mutual action of their minute parts. This appears
because the effects of that intestine motion and mutual action of their
minute parts is exactly the same. From that intestine action, they all
continually send forth, as it were, an infinite quantity of their minute
parts, parts of the same kind, in like manner affecting the organ of our
sight and all causing the like sensation in us, and in like manner
reflected and refracted by glass, water, and other bodies. They are all
emitted in the same manner: all with, as it were, an infinite celerity
and in like manner disposed to pierce both transparent bodies and to be
absorbed by opaque and dark bodies, and in every respect subject to the
same laws with the particles of matter emitted by the sun. Whatever the
powers be by which the internal minute parts of the sun act on one
another, by which many of these minute parts leap forth to such a
distance, if it be a mutual attraction and repulsion, these are most
evidently the same powers or the same laws of intestine motion by which
the inward parts of the fixed stars act on one another, because the
effects are so exactly the same. And the minute parts of these bodies,
that by means of that action are emitted, even to such a distance as we
are, are still here governed in their motions by just the same laws as
the rays of the sun, being reflected and refracted by different degrees
of refrangibility, causing the same different colors or sensations in
us. This exact agreement of the inward nature which creating power has
given all these bodies, and the laws of the motion of their minute parts
producing such wonderful effects, is a most remarkable evidence that one
common cause has made and does uphold and influence and actuate and
govern all. Such an unity of invention and device shows the unity of the
causes. Light is a strange work of God. There is nothing in the whole
external creation wherein appears a more admirable contrivance than
this. It appears to be the same in this solar system and in all those
infinitely distant systems.
II. I would observe
wherein these distant systems do not only agree together but are united
one to another so as to become one great system, which is a further
evidence that they all have one cause.
1. The parts of these
different systems are communicated to or diffused through each other by
the rays of light that are transmitted. Thus I suppose there are beams
of light from several millions of fixed stars diffused every moment
through every part of this solar system so that there is not a hair’s
breadth distance of [i.e., between] some of their beams for one second
of time, unless where the beams are intercepted by some opaque body,
which is but a very small part of the system. And consequently we may
suppose that each star thus diffuses her parts through millions of the
systems of other stars.
Now upon a supposition of
several gods as the creators of the several systems, then we must
suppose that the same gods that made these different stars have clothed
them with their light, and have created and do maintain their beams
because of their power. Hence, we must either suppose that many millions
of gods that are the authors of the diverse systems are present in each
system at once and throughout that system, each one, by his powers and
energy, accompanying the rays of his own system, maintaining their
motion and action in every part of it, every moment — and so, that the
god of each distinct system is present every moment by his mighty power
and energy throughout every minute part of the systems of millions of
other gods, at the same time that these millions of other gods are, all
of them, also in like manner present, by a like power and energy, all of
them, through every part of each system. Or else we must suppose that
all these many millions of gods, though entirely distinct and
independent, have by mutual, perfect, and immutable consent, agreed to
observe the parts of the systems of the other gods and, at the
boundaries of the systems and from these limits to take care of them,
and by their power and energy to uphold them and actuate them — both
which appears very absurd.
2. The parts of these different systems are not only communicated to and
diffused through one another, but act upon one another, and there is a
mutual action and reaction between their different blended parts by the
same laws of matter and motion. Thus, for instance, the rays of the
fixed stars do not only enter this system and are diffused through it,
but they act upon the parts of it, and the parts of this react upon them
by the laws of this system. So the rays of the fixed stars act on our
organs of sight, and so there is action and reaction between them and
our air, as appears by the brilliancy of the fixed stars and the
refraction of their rays by the atmosphere, and between them and water
and glass and other transparent bodies, and also between them and all
opaque bodies that do reflect them, as appears by their being
enlightened by them in a starlight night. Now how unreasonable it is to
suppose any other than that this action and reaction are both by the
laws and influence of the same God!
3. These parts of different systems that are continually transmitted
into and diffused through each other are liable to be converted into
parts of these other systems (as Sir Isaac Newton has shown how rays of
light after frequent reflection and refraction do at length cease their
motion and do stick to the solid parts of other bodies). And what can be
supposed in this case but absurdity in supposing the matter of different
systems to be created and upheld by different gods?
4. Ancient observation shows that fixed stars have a great influence
upon, and a sort of government over, sublunery things — the weather, and
the frame and temperament of the bodies of plants and animals.
These things show that all
these different systems take hold of one another and influence and act
upon one another as the different wheels of a machine. It is reasonable,
therefore, to suppose that all have one maker. Since we see the machine
to be one, it is unreasonable to suppose any other than that one and the
same artificer made it, and that one and the same owner possesses and
takes care of its motions, and not that one made and takes care of one
wheel, and another another.
|
