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Common Illumination
533. Law of Nature. The
Apostle says (Rom. 2:14-15) that the Gentiles which have not the law do
by nature the things contained in the law. Those having not the law are
a law unto themselves, which shows the work of the law written in their
hearts, their conscience also bearing witness. In order to men’s having
the law of God made known to them by the light of nature, two things are
necessary: the light of nature must not only discover to them that these
and these things are their duty, i.e., that they are right, that there
is a justice and equality in them, and the contrary unjust, but it must
discover to them also that it is the will of God that they should be
done, and that they shall incur his displeasure by the contrary. For a
law is a signification of the will of a lawgiver, with the danger of the
effects of his displeasure in case of the breach of that law. The
Gentiles had both these. Their natural consciences testified to the
latter after this manner. Natural conscience suggests to every man the
relation and agreement there is between that which is wrong or unjust
and punishment. This naturally disposes man to expect it. To think of
wrong and injustice, especially such as often is seen without any
punishment to balance it, is shocking to men’s minds. Men, therefore,
are naturally averse to thinking that there will be no punishments,
especially when they themselves are great sufferers by injustice and
have it not in their power to avenge themselves. And the same sense made
guilty persons zealous lest they should meet with their deserved
punishment. And this kept up in the world among all nations the doctrine
of superior powers that would revenge iniquity. This sense of men’s
consciences kept alive that tradition and made it easily and naturally
received. The light of nature discovered the being of a deity otherwise,
but this sense of conscience upheld this notion of him — that he was the
avenger of evil. And it also made them the more easily believe the being
of a deity itself. God also gave many evidences, in his providence
amongst the heathen, that he was the revenger of iniquity. When the
light of nature discovered to them that there was a God that governed
the world, they the more easily believed him to be a just being, and so
that he hated injustice because it appeared horrid to think of a supreme
judge of the universe that was unjust. Gen. 18:25, “Shall not the judge
of all the earth do right?”
626. Spirit’s Operation.
Nature. Grace. Common Grace. Special Regeneration. (Vid. No. 471.)
Natural men may have convictions from the Spirit of God, but it is from
the Spirit of God only as assisting natural principles and not infusing
any new and supernatural principle. That conviction of guilt which a
natural man may have from the Spirit of God is only by the Spirit’s
assisting natural conscience the better and more fully to do its office.
Therein common grace differs from special. Common grace is only the
assistance of natural principles, while special is the infusing and
exciting supernatural principles. Or if these words are too abstruse,
common grace only assists the faculties of the soul to do that more
fully which they do by nature. Man’s natural conscience will, by mere
nature, render him in a degree sensible of guilt. It will accuse a man
and condemn him when he has done amiss. The Spirit of God, in those
convictions which natural men sometimes have, assists conscience to do
this in a further degree and helps the natural principles against those
things that tend to stupefy it and to hinder its free exercise. But
special grace causes the faculties to do that that they do not by
nature; causes those things to be in the soul that are above nature and
of which there is nothing of the like kind in the soul by nature; and
causes them to be in the soul habitually and according to such a stated
constitution or law that lays such a foundation for a continued course
of exercises as is called a principle of nature — such as a principle of
life in a plant or animal, or a principle of sensation or natural
appetites, etc.
732. Common Illumination.
The nature of the work of the Spirit may be learnt from the nature of
his work in legal conviction. It is the same common enlightening
assistance of both, but only one is of evil and the other of good. Those
legal convictions that natural men have are from the common illumination
of the Spirit of God concerning evil. Those pleasant religious
affections and apprehensions that natural men sometimes have are from
the common illuminations of the Spirit of God concerning good. The
assistance given is of a like sort in both, but only the object is
different. One respects good and the other evil, both of which natural
men are equally capable of apprehending without any supernatural
principle. The mind of man without a supernatural principle is capable
of two things with respect to conviction of evil:
1. The judgment is capable
of being convinced of evil. Man’s natural reason is capable of
discerning force in those arguments that prove it, though sin greatly
clouds the judgment concerning these things. A natural man’s reason, by
common assistance of it against the clouding, prejudicing, and
stupefying nature of sin, is capable of seeing the force of many
arguments that prove God’s anger and future punishment, and the
greatness of these things. And so a natural man is capable of being
convinced how much there is in him contrary to God’s law, and to how
great a degree it is contrary, and what connection there is between
these faults and God’s anger and future punishment.
2. Besides a conviction of
truth respecting evil in the judgment, a natural man, as such, is
capable of a sense of heart of this evil, i.e., he is capable of a
deeply impressed and lively and affecting idea and sense of these things
which is something more than a mere conviction in the judgment
concerning their truth. The mind of a natural man is capable of a sense
of the heart of natural things, or of those things that are terrible to
nature. And, therefore, what the Spirit of God does in legal conviction
or, which is the same thing, common illuminations of evil is to assist
those principles, viz., the natural reason or judgment, against the
prejudicing, blinding tendency of sin, and to assist the sense of the
heart against the stupefying nature of sin.
And it is the same kind of
influence or assistance that is given in common convictions and
illuminations of good, whereby the souls of natural men are affected
with thoughts of God’s love and pity and kindness to them or others, of
benefits offered or bestowed on them, of being beloved of God, of being
delivered from calamity, of having honor put upon them of God, and the
like. For the mind of man, without any supernatural principles, is in
like manner capable of two things, viz., 1. Of a conviction of the
judgment by reasons that evince the truth of the things of religion that
respect natural good, and 2. Of a sense of heart of natural good. And so
God assists these principles in common illumination. And it is to be
noted that a conviction of evil abundantly makes way for such a
conviction of good. A conviction of sin and guilt makes way for a
conviction of the greatness of mercy held for them, and a conviction of
danger of misery prepares for a more sensible, affecting idea of God’s
pity appearing either in comfortable words of Scriptures, or in the
great works of God in redemption, or in his particular providence
towards the person affected.
Such a conviction and
illumination of the mind or such an assistance of the soul to a sense of
the good or evil things of religion is the proper work of the Spirit of
God. For the Spirit of God is indeed the author of our capacity of
discerning or having a sense of heart of natural good or evil. For this
really differs not from the faculty of man’s will. And it was especially
the work of the Spirit of God in creation, wherein the three persons of
the Trinity were conjunct, to infuse this principle — this part of the
natural image of God. For herein man is made in the image of God who has
understanding and will, which will is the same with the Holy Ghost. And
therefore the assisting this principle in its acting and in giving a
sense of good and evil is proper to the Holy Ghost.
782. Ideas. Sense of the Heart. Spiritual Knowledge or Conviction.
Faith. Great part of our thoughts and the discourse of our minds
concerning things is without the actual ideas of those things of which
we discourse and reason, but the mind makes use of signs instead of the
ideas themselves. A little attentive reflection may be enough to
convince anyone of this. Let any man, for his own satisfaction, take any
book and read down one page of it as fast as he ordinarily is wont to
read with understanding. He finishes perhaps the whole page in about a
minute of time, wherein, it may be, were many such terms as God, man,
angel, people, misery, happiness, salvation, distinction, consideration,
perplexity, sanctification, and many more such like. And then let him
consider whether he has had the actual ideas of all those things, and
things signified by many other words in the whole page, in this short
space of time. And particularly let him consider whether or no, when in
the course of his reading he came upon the word “God” in such a line,
which his mind dwelt not a moment upon, whether or no he had an actual
idea of God, i.e., whether he had an actual idea, that moment, of those
things that are principally essential in an idea of God: as whether he
had an actual idea of supremacy, of supreme power, of supreme
government, of supreme knowledge, of will, etc. I apprehend that
diligent attention will convince him that he has no actual idea of one
of these things when he understandingly reads, or hears, or speaks the
word “God.” I will instance but in one thing that seems most found a
notion of all [i.e., most commonly found] in the idea of God, viz.,
understanding or knowledge. He will find that in such cases he had no
actual idea at all of this. For if he had an actual idea of
understanding or knowledge, then he had an actual idea of ideas — of
ideas of perception or consciousness; of judging or perceiving
connections and relations between different ideas, and so had an actual
idea of various ideas and relations between them. So when he read the
word “people,” let him inquire whether he had any actual idea of that
which was signified by this word. In order to this he must have an
actual idea of man. I do not mean only a confused idea of an outer
appearance like that of man, for if that was all, that was not an idea
of man properly but only a sign made use of instead of an idea. But he
must have an actual idea of those things wherein manhood most
essentially consists, as an idea of reason, which contains many other
actual ideas — as an actual idea of consciousness, an actual idea of a
disposal of ideas in the mind, an actual idea of a consequent perception
of relations and connections between them, etc. And so he must have an
actual idea of will, which contains an actual idea of pleasure and pain,
agreeableness and disagreeableness, and a consequent command or imperate
act of the soul, etc. So when he read the word “perplexity,” let him
consider whether he had an actual idea of that actual thing signified by
that word which contained many actual ideas — as an actual idea of
thought and an actual idea of intenseness of thought, and also
earnestness of desire, an actual idea of disappointment or crassness to
desire (which contains many other actual ideas), and an actual idea of
manifoldness of troubles and crosses, etc. So when he read the word
“sanctification,” the actual idea of which contains a great many actual
ideas, viz., an actual idea of what is implied in the faculties of an
intelligent voluntary being, and then an actual idea of holiness, which
contains a great number of other actual ideas.
But I need not insist on more instances. I should think that these might
be enough to convince anyone that there is very often no actual idea of
those things when we are said to think of them, and that the thought is
not employed about things themselves immediately, or immediately
exercised in the idea itself, but only some sign that the mind
habitually substitutes in the room of the idea. Our thoughts are
oftentimes ten times swifter than our reading or speech. Men oftentimes
think that in a few minutes which it would take them a long time to
speak. And if there be no room to suppose that all the ideas signified
by the words of a discourse can be actually excited in the mind in
reading or speaking, much less can it be in such swift discourse of
thought.
We thus, in the discourse of our minds, generally make use of signs
instead of ideas, especially with respect to two kinds of subjects of
our thoughts, viz., 1. With respect to general things, or kinds and
sorts; such are kinds of substances and such also are what Mr. Locke
calls “mixed modes.” When we, in the course of our thoughts, in reading
or hearing or speaking or meditation, think of any sort of substance or
distinct beings, as particularly of men, instead of going about with
attention of mind actually to excite the ideas of those things that
belong to the nature of man, that are essential to it, and that
distinguish it from other creatures, and so having actually such an
abstract idea as Mr. Locke speaks of, we have only an idea of something
in our mind, either a name or some external sensible idea that we use as
a sign to represent that idea: so when, in the discourse of our minds,
there passes a thought of that sort of creatures called lions, or that
sort of natural bodies called metal, or that called trees, and so in
mixed modes such as compassion, decency, harmony, and the like.
2. It is commonly so in
our discourses of those things that we can know only by reflection,
which are of a spiritual nature, or things that consist in the ideas,
acts, and exercises of minds. It has been shown elsewhere [See M 123, M
201, and especially M 238.] that there is no actual idea of those things
but what consists in the actual existence of the same things, or like
things, in our own minds. For instance, to excite the idea of an idea we
must have that very idea in our minds, we must have the same idea. To
have an actual idea of a thought is to have that thought, that we have
an idea of, then in our minds. To have an actual idea of any pleasure or
delight, there must be excited a degree of that delight. So to have an
actual idea of any trouble or kind of pain, there must be excited a
degree of that pain or trouble, and to have an idea of any affection of
the mind, there must be then present a degree of that affection. This
alone is sufficient to show that in great part of our discourses and
reasonings on things, we are without the actual ideas of those things of
which we discourse and reason. For most of our discourses and reasonings
are about things that belong to minds or things that we know by
reflection, or at least do involve some relation to them in some respect
or other. But how far are we, when we speak or read or hear or think of
those beings that have minds (or intelligent beings), or of their
faculties and powers, or their dispositions, principles, and acts, and
those mixed modes that involve relations to these things, from actually
having present in our minds those mental things, those thoughts, and
those mental acts that those spiritual things do consists in or are
related to! Very commonly we discourse about them in our minds and argue
and reason concerning them, without any idea at all of the things
themselves in any degree, but only make use of the signs instead of the
ideas. As for instance, how often do we think and speak of the pleasure
and delight or pain and trouble that such have, or have had, in such and
such things, or things that do in some respect involve pleasure or pain
in their idea, without the presence of any degree of that pleasure or
that trouble, or any real idea of those troublesome or pleasing
sensations!
Those signs that we are wont to make use of in our thoughts for
representations of things, and to substitute in the room of the actual
ideas themselves, are either the ideas of the names by which we are wont
to call them or the idea of some external sensible thing that some way
belongs to the things — some sensible image or resemblance, or some
sensible part, or some sensible effect, or sensible concomitant, or a
few sensible circumstances. We have the ideas of some of those excited,
which we substitute in the room of those things that are most essential,
and use them as signs as we do words, and have respect to them no
further in our discourse. Hence we do not stand at all on the clearness
and distinctness of that external idea that we thus make use of, but
commonly it is very dim and transient and exceeding confused and
indistinct — as when in a course of meditations we think of man, angels,
nations, conversion, conviction. If we have anything further in our
thoughts to represent those things than only the words, we commonly have
only some very confused, passing notion of something external, something
we do not at all insist on the clearness and distinctness of. Nor do we
find any need of it, because we make use of that external idea no
otherwise than as a sign of the idea or something to stand in its stead.
And the notion need not be distinct in order to that, because we may
habitually understand the use of it as a sign without it. Whereas it
would be of great consequence that it should be clear and distinct if we
regarded it as an actual idea and proper representation of the thing
itself. The signs that those that have the use of speech do principally
make use of in their thoughts are words or names, which are indeed very
frequently accompanied with some slight confused glance of some sensible
idea that belongs to the thing named, but the name is the principal sign
the mind makes use of. Others that are deaf and dumb do probably make
use of the ideas of those signs which they have been accustomed to
signify the thing by, or (if we may judge by what we find in things that
we have no names for, and there are many such) they make use of some
sensible effect, part, concomitant, or circumstance as the sign.
It is something external or sensible that we are wont to make use of for
signs of the ideas of the things themselves. For they are much more
ready at hand and more easily excited than ideas of spiritual or mental
things, which for the most part cannot be without attentive reflection.
And very often the force of the mind is not sufficient to excite them at
all, because we are not able to excite in our minds those acts,
exercises, or passions of the mind that we think of.
We are under a necessity
of thus putting signs in our minds instead of the actual ideas of the
things signified, on several accounts: partly by reason of the
difficulty of exciting the actual ideas of things, especially in things
that are not external and sensible, which are a kind of things that we
are mainly concerned with; and also because, if we must have the actual
ideas of everything that comes in our way in the course of our thought,
this would render our thoughts so slow as to render our powers of
thinking in a great measure useless, as may be seen in the instance
mentioned of a man reading down a page. Now if we use signs instead of
the actual ideas themselves, we can sufficiently understand what is
contained in that page in a minute of time, and can express the same
thoughts to another in as little time by our voices, and can think ten
times as swiftly as we can read or speak. But if in order to an
understanding of what was contained in that page, we must have an actual
idea of everything signified by every word in that page, it would take
us up many hours to go through with it. For taking in all the ideas that
are either directly signified, or involved in relations that are
signified by them, it would take us up a considerable time before we
could be said to understand one word. But if our understandings were so
slow, it would frustrate all use of reading or writing and all use of
speech — yea, and all improvement of a faculty of thinking, too. And if
all our thoughts must have proceeded after this slow manner from our
infancy, we must have remained infants all the days of our lives, and
seventy years would have been sufficient to have proceeded but a few
steps in knowledge.
This way of thinking by
signs, unless as it is abused to an indulgence of a slothful inattentive
disposition, may well serve us to many of the common purposes of
thinking. For in many respects we, without the actual presence of the
idea, know how to use the sign as if it were the idea itself. Having
learned by frequent experience, our minds in the presence of the sign
being habitually led to the relations and connections with other things,
the presence of the sign in the mind does by custom as naturally and
spontaneously suggest many relations of the thing signified to others,
as the hearing of such a certain sound or seeing such letters does by
custom and habit spontaneously excite such a thought. But if we are at a
loss concerning a connection or consequence, or have a new inference to
draw, or would see the force of some new argument, then commonly we are
put to the trouble of exciting the actual idea and making it as lively
and clear as we can. And in this consists very much of that which we
call attention of the mind in thinking. And the force or strength of a
mind consists very much in an ability to excite actual ideas so as to
have them lively and clear, and its comprehension, whereby it is able to
excite several at once to that degree as to see their connections and
relations.
Here, by the way, we may
observe the exceeding imperfection of the human understanding and one
thing wherein it appears immensely below God’s understanding, in that he
understands himself and all other things by the actual and immediate
presence of an idea of the things understood. All his understanding is
not only by actual ideas of things without ever being put to it to make
use of signs instead of ideas (either through an inability or difficulty
of exciting those ideas, or to avoid a slow progress of thoughts that
would arise by so manifold and exact an attention), but he has the
actual ideas of things perfectly in his mind without the least defect of
any part and with perfect clearness, and without the imperfection of
that fleetingness or transitoriness that attends our ideas, and without
any troublesome exertion of the mind to hold the idea there, and without
the trouble we are at to have in view a number at once that we may see
the relations. But he has the ideas of all things at once in his mind,
and all in the highest possible perfection of clearness, and all
permanently and invariably there without any transitoriness or fading in
any part. Our understandings are not only subject to the imperfections
that consist in those things which necessitates us to make use of such
signs as we have been speaking of, but this is a source of innumerable
errors that we are subject to. Though, as was said before, such a use of
signs serves us well to many purposes, yet the want of the actual ideas,
and making use only of the signs instead of them, causes mankind to run
into a multitude of errors, the falsity of which would be manifest to
them if the ideas themselves were present.
From what has been said,
we see that there are two ways of thinking and understanding, especially
of spiritual or mental things that we receive a notion of by reflection
or consciousness: viz., 1. That wherein we do not directly view the
things themselves by the actual presence of their ideas or (which is the
same thing in mental matters) sensation of their resemblances, but
apprehend them only indirectly in their signs, which is a kind of a
mental reading wherein we do not look on the things themselves but only
on those signs of them that are before our eyes. This is a mere
cogitation without any proper apprehension of the things thought of. 2.
There is that which is more properly called apprehension, wherein the
mind has a direct ideal view or contemplation of the thing thought of.
This ideal apprehension or
view of mental things is either: 1. Of things that pertain merely to the
faculty of understanding, or what is figuratively called the head,
including all the modes of mere discerning, judging, or speculation; or
2. Of things that appertain to the other faculty of the will, or what is
figuratively called the heart, whereby things are pleasing or
displeasing, including all agreeableness and disagreeableness, all
beauty and deformity, all pleasure and pain, and all those sensations,
exercises, and passions of the mind that arise from either of those. An
ideal apprehension or view of things of this latter sort is what is
vulgarly called a having a sense. It is commonly said, when a person has
an ideal view of anything of this nature, that he has a sense of it in
his mind, and it is very properly so expressed. For by what has been
said already, persons cannot have actual ideas of mental things without
having those very things in the mind. And seeing all of this latter sort
of mental things that belong to the faculty of will or the heart do, in
great part at least, consist in a sensation of agreeableness or
disagreeableness, and a sense or feeling of the heart of pleasedness or
displeasedness, therefore it will follow that everyone that has an ideal
view of those things has therein some measure of that inward feeling or
sense.
Hence arises another great distinction of the kinds of understanding of
mental things, or those things that appertain or relate to spiritual
beings, which is somewhat diverse from the former, viz., of speculative
and sensible: or 1. That understanding which consists in mere
speculation or the understanding of the head; and 2. That which consists
in the sense of the heart. The former includes all that understanding
that is without any proper ideal apprehension or view and all that
understanding of mental things of either faculty that is only by signs.
And also all ideal views of things that are merely intellectual or
appertain only to the faculty of understanding, i.e., all that
understanding of things that do not consist in or imply some motion of
the will or, in other words (to speak figuratively) some feeling of the
heart, is mere speculative knowledge, whether it be an ideal
apprehension of them or no. But all that understanding of things that
does consist in or involve such a sense or feeling is not merely
speculative but sensible knowledge. So is all ideal apprehension of
beauty and deformity, or loveliness and hatefulness; and all ideas of
delight or comfort, or pleasure of body or mind, pain, trouble, or
misery; and all ideal apprehensions of desires and longings, esteem,
acquiescence, hope, fear, contempt, choosing, refusing, assenting,
rejecting, loving, hating, anger, and the idea of all the affections of
the mind, and all their motions and exercises; and all ideal views of
dignity or excellency of any kind; and also all ideas of terrible
greatness, or awful majesty, meanness, or contemptibleness, value and
importance. All knowledge of this sort, as it is of things that concern
the heart or the will and affections, so it all relates to the good or
evil that the sensible knowledge of things of this nature involves. And
nothing is called a sensible knowledge upon any other account but on the
account of the sense or kind of inward tasting or feeling of sweetness
or pleasure, bitterness or pains, that is implied in it or arises from
it. Yet it is not only the mere ideal apprehension of that good or evil
that is included in what is called “being sensible of,” but also that
ideal apprehension of other things that appertain to the thing known, on
which the goodness or evil that attends them depends. As for instance,
some men are said to have a sense of the dreadfulness of God’s
displeasure. This apprehension of God’s displeasure is called having a
sense, and is to be looked upon as a part of sensible knowledge because
of that evil or pain in the object of God’s displeasure, or that is
connected with that displeasure — an idea of what God is supposed to
feel in his own heart in having that displeasure. But yet, in a sense of
the terribleness of God’s displeasure there is implied an ideal
apprehension of more things than merely of that pain or misery, or sense
of God’s heart. There is implied an ideal apprehension of the being of
God and of some intellectual existence, and an ideal apprehension of his
greatness and of the greatness of his power. An ideal apprehension or
view of those things is, in vulgar speech, called an having a sense of
them. And in proportion to the intensive degree of this ideal
apprehension or the clearness and liveliness of the idea of them, so
persons are said to have a greater or lesser sense of them. And
according to the easiness or difficulty of persons receiving such a
sense of things, especially things that it much concerns them to be
sensible of, are they called either sensible or stupid.
This distribution of the
human knowledge into speculative and sensible, though it seems to
pertain to only one particular kind of the objects of our knowledge —
viz., those things that appertain or relate to the will and affections —
yet indeed may be extended to all the knowledge we have of all objects
whatsoever. For there is no kind of thing that we know but what may be
considered as in some respect or other concerning the wills or hearts of
spiritual beings. And indeed we are concerned to know nothing on any
other account. So that perhaps this distinction of the kinds of our
knowledge into speculative and sensible, if duly weighed, will be found
the most important of all. The distribution is with respect to those
properties of our knowledge that immediately relate to the end of all
our knowledge, and to that in the objects of our knowledge on the
account of which alone they are worthy to be known, viz., their relation
to our wills and affections and interest — as good or evil, important or
otherwise — and the respect they have to our happiness or misery.
The will, in all its
determinations whatsoever, is governed by its thoughts and apprehensions
of things with regard to those properties of the objects of its thoughts
wherein the degree of the sense of the heart has a main influence.
There is a twofold division or distribution that may be made of the
kinds of sensible knowledge of things that men have.
The first is with respect to the ways we come by it. 1. There’s that
which is purely natural: either such as men’s minds come to be impressed
with by the objects that are about them by the laws of nature, or when
they behold anything that is beautiful or deformed by a beauty and
deformity that men by nature are sensible of, then they have sensible
knowledge of that beauty or deformity — as when the ear hears a variety
of sounds harmoniously proportioned, the soul has a sensible knowledge
of the excellency of the sound. When it tastes any good or ill savor or
odor, it has a sensible knowledge of the excellency or hatefulness of
that savor or odor. So it may have a sensible knowledge of many things
by memory and reflection. So a man may have a sensible apprehension of
pleasure or sorrow that others are the subjects of, indirectly by
reflection, either by exciting from the memory something that he has
felt heretofore which he supposes is like it, or by placing himself in
other’s circumstances, or by placing things about himself in his
imagination and, from ideas so put together in his mind, exciting
something of a like pleasure or pain transiently in himself. And if
those ideas come so together into the mind by the senses, or by the
relation of others, such a sensation will spontaneously arise in the
mind. In like manner men may have a sense of their own happiness or
misery conceived as future. So men may, by mere nature, come to have a
sense of the importance or terribleness or desirableness of many things.
2. That sense of things which we do not receive without some immediate
influence of the Spirit of God, impressing a sense of things that do
concern our greatest interest on our minds. It is found very often a
very difficult thing to excite a sense of temporal things in the mind,
requiring great attention and close application of thought. And many
times it is not in our power. And in many instances wherein we have a
sense of temporal things that is purely natural, it depends not merely
on the force of our thoughts but the circumstances we are in, or some
special accidental situation and concurrence of things in the course of
our thoughts and meditations, or some particular incident in providence
that excites a sense of things or gives an ideal view of them in a way
inexplicable. But the exciting a sense of things pertaining to our
eternal interest is a thing that we are so far from and so unable to
obtain of ourselves (by reason of the direction of the inclinations and
natural dispositions of the soul away from those things as they are, and
the sinking of our intellectual powers, and the great subjection of the
soul in its fallen state to the external senses), that a due sense of
those things is never attained without immediate divine assistance.
It is in this that the ordinary work of the Spirit of God in the hearts
of men consists, viz., in giving a sense of spiritual and eternal
things, or things that appertain to the business of religion and our
eternal interest. The extraordinary influence of the Spirit of God in
inspiration imparts speculative knowledge to the soul, but the ordinary
influence of God’s Spirit communicates only a sensible knowledge of
those things that the mind had a speculative knowledge of before. And an
imagination that some have of speculative knowledge received from the
Spirit of God in those that have no real inspiration is that wherein
enthusiasm consists.
Secondly, the other distribution that may be made of the kinds of
sensible knowledge is according to the different nature of the objects
of it, into a sense of things with respect to the natural good or evil
that is in them or that relates to them, or a sense of them with respect
to spiritual good or evil. By spiritual good, I mean all true moral
good, all real moral beauty and excellency, and all those acts of the
will or that sense of the heart that relates to it and the idea of which
involves it, and all sense of it, all relish and desire of it and
delight in it, happiness consisting in it, etc. By natural good and
evil, I mean all that good or evil which is agreeable or disagreeable to
human nature as such, without regard to the moral disposition — as all
natural beauty and deformity such as a visible, sensible proportion or
disproportion in figures, sounds, and colors; any good or evil that is
the object of the external senses; and all that good or evil which
arises from gratifying or crossing any of the natural appetites; all
that good and evil which consists in gratifying or crossing a principle
of self-love and consisting in others’ esteem of us and love to us, or
their hatred and contempt; and that desirableness or undesirableness of
moral dispositions and actions so far as arising from hence; and all
that importance, worth, or terribleness arising from a relation to this
natural good or evil.
Persons are capable of
sensible knowledge of things of religion of the former sort — viz., with
respect to the natural good or evil that attends them — of themselves,
with the same improvement of their natural powers that they have of that
sensible knowledge of temporal things, because this good and evil
consists in an agreeableness or disagreeableness to human nature as
such; and therefore no principles are required in men beyond those that
are contained in human nature to discern them. But yet by reason of the
natural stupidity of the soul with respect to things so diverse from all
the objects of sense and so opposite to the natural disposition of the
heart, it is found by experience that men never will obtain any very
considerable sense of them without the influence of the Spirit of God
assisting the faculties of human nature and impressing a lively sense of
them. But as to the other, viz., a sense of divine things with respect
to spiritual good and evil, because these do not consist in any
agreeableness or disagreeableness to human nature as such, or the mere
human faculties and principles, therefore man, merely with the exercise
of those faculties and his own natural strength, can do nothing towards
getting such a sense of divine things. But it must be wholly and
entirely a work of the Spirit of God, not merely as assisting and
co-working with natural principles, but infusing something above nature.
By the things that have
been said, we may see the difference between the influences of the
Spirit of God on the minds of natural men in awakenings, common
convictions, and illuminations, and his spiritual influences on the
hearts of the saints at and after their conversion. 1. Natural men,
while they are senseless and unawakened, have very little sensible
knowledge of the things of religion, even with respect to the natural
good and evil that is in them and attends them. And indeed, they have
very little of any ideal apprehension of any sort of divine and eternal
things, by reason of their being left to the stupefying influence of sin
and the objects of sense. But when they are awakened and convinced, the
Spirit of God, by assisting their natural powers, gives them an ideal
apprehension of the things of religion with respect to what is natural
in them, i.e., of that which is speculative in them, and that which
pertains to a sensibleness of their natural good and evil, or all but
only that which involves a sense of their spiritual excellency. The
Spirit of God assists to an ideal view of God’s natural perfections
wherein consists his greatness, and gives a view of this as manifested
in his works that he has done and in the words that he has spoken, and
so gives a sensible apprehension of the heinousness of sin and his wrath
against it, and the guilt of it, and the terribleness of the sufferings
denounced against it. And so they have a sense of the importance of
things of religion in general. And herein consists what we commonly call
conviction and a sense of the natural good that attends the things of
religion, viz., the favor of so great a being, his mercy, as it relates
to our natural good or deliverance from natural evil, the glory of
heaven with respect to the natural good that is to be enjoyed there, and
like wise those affecting, joyful common illuminations that natural men
sometimes have. In thus assisting men’s faculties to an ideal
apprehension of the natural things of religion, together with what
assistance God may give men’s natural reason and judgment to see the
force of natural arguments, consists the whole of the common work of the
Spirit of God in man. It consists only in assisting natural principles
without infusing anything supernatural. 2. The spiritual work of the
Spirit of God, or that which is peculiar to the saints, consists in
giving the sensible knowledge of the things of religion with respect to
their spiritual good or evil, which indeed does all originally consist
in a sense of the spiritual excellency, beauty, or sweetness of divine
things. This is not by assisting natural principles but by infusing
something supernatural.
The ideal apprehension and sensible knowledge of the things of religion
will give that conviction of their truth or reality which can no
otherwise be obtained, and is the principal source of that conviction of
the truth of the things of religion that is given by the immediate
influence of the Spirit of God on men’s hearts.
1. An ideal apprehension and sensible knowledge of the things of
religion with respect to what is natural in them, such as natural men
have that are under awakenings, will give some degree of conviction of
the truth of divine things further than a mere notion of them in their
signs, or only a speculative apprehension of them, because by this means
men are enabled to see in many instances the agreement of the
declarations and threatenings of the Word of God with the nature of
things that, without an ideal and sensible knowledge of them, they could
not have — as for instance, they that from the tokens of God’s
greatness, his power, and awful majesty in his works and in his words,
have an idea or sense of that greatness and power and awful majesty, and
so see the agreement between such works and such words and such power
and majesty, and therefore have a conviction of that truth that
otherwise they could not have, viz., that it is a very great being that
made those things and spoke those things. And so from a sense they may
hence have of the dreadfulness of the wrath of such a being, they have a
conviction of the truth of what the Scripture teaches about the
dreadfulness of God’s wrath and of the punishment of hell. And from the
sense they hereby have of the heinousness or dreadfulness of sin against
such a God, and the natural agreement between affronts of such a majesty
and the suffering of extreme misery, it appears much more credible to
them that there is indeed an extreme misery to be suffered for sin. And
so a sense of the natural good that there is in the things of religion,
such as is given in common illuminations, makes what the Scriptures
declare of the blessedness of heaven, etc. more credible.
2. An ideal and sensible
apprehension of the spiritual excellency of divine things is the proper
source of all spiritual conviction of the truth of divine things, or
that belief of their truth that there is in saving faith. There can be
no saving conviction without it, and it is the great thing that mainly
distinguishes saving belief from all other. And the thing wherein its
distinguishing essence does properly lie is that it has a sense of the
divine or spiritual excellency of the things of religion as that which
it arises from. All saving conviction of divine truth does most
effectively arise from the spiritual sense of the excellency of divine
things. Yet this sense of spiritual excellency is not the only kind of
ideal apprehension or sense of divine things that is concerned in such a
conviction, but it also partly depends on a sensible knowledge of what
is natural in religion — as this may be needful to prepare the mind for
a sense of its spiritual excellency and, as such, a sense of its
spiritual excellency may depend upon it. For as the spiritual excellency
of the things of religion itself does depend on and presuppose those
things that are natural in religion, they being, as it were, the
substratum of this spiritual excellency, so a sense or ideal
apprehension of the one depends in some measure on the ideal
apprehension of the other. Thus a sense of the excellency of God’s mercy
in forgiving sin depends on a sense of the great guilt of sin, the great
punishment it deserves. A sense of the beauty and wonderfulness of
divine grace does in great measure depend on a sense of the greatness
and majesty of that being whose grace it is, and so indeed a sense of
the glory of God’s holiness and all his moral perfections. A sense of
the excellency of Christ’s salvation depends on a sense of the misery
and great guilt of those that are the subjects of this salvation. And so
that saving conviction of the truths of things of religion does most
directly and immediately depend on a sense of their spiritual
excellency, yet it also, in some measure, more indirectly and remotely
depends on an ideal apprehension of what is natural in religion, and is
a common conviction.
Common conviction, or an
ideal and sensible apprehension of what is natural in the things of
religion, contributes to a saving conviction of the truth of the gospel,
especially this way: men, by being made sensible of the great guilt of
sin or the connection or natural agreeableness there is between that and
a dreadful punishment, and how that the greatness and majesty of God
seems to require and demand such a punishment, they are brought to see
the great need of a satisfaction or something to intervene to make it
honorable to that majesty to show them favor. And being for a while
blind to the suitableness of Christ’s satisfaction in order to this, and
then afterwards having a sense given them of Christ’s divine excellency
and so of the glorious dignity of his person and what he did and
suffered for sinners: hereby their eyes are, as it were, opened to see
the perfect fitness there is in this to satisfy for sin or to render
their being received into favor consistent with the honor of God’s
offended majesty. The sight of this excellent congruity does very
powerfully convince of the truth of the gospel. This way of satisfying
for the sins, which now they see to be so congruous, is certainly a real
way — not a mere figment but a divine contrivance — and convinces that
there is indeed acceptance to be had with God in this. And so the soul
savingly believes in Christ. The sight of this congruity convinces the
more strongly when at last it is seen because, though the person was
often told of it before, yet he could see nothing of it, which convinces
that it was beyond the invention of men to discover it. For by
experience they found themselves all their lifetime wholly blind to it,
but now they see the perfect suitableness there is, which convinces them
of the divine wisdom (that is beyond the wisdom of men) that contrived
it.
The truth that the soul is
most immediately convinced of in this case by a sense of the divine
excellency of Christ, with a preparatory sense of the need of
satisfaction for sin, is not that the gospel is the Word of God. But
this is the truth the mind firstly and more directly falls under a
conviction of, viz., that the way of salvation that the gospel reveals
is a proper, suitable, and sufficient way, perfectly agreeable to reason
and the nature of things, and that which tends to answer the ends
proposed. And the mind being convinced of this truth, which is the great
subject of the gospel, it then naturally and immediately infers from
this fitness and sufficiency of this salvation, which the mind has
experienced to be so much beyond the power of human reason of itself to
discover, that it is certainly a contrivance of a superhuman excellent
wisdom, holiness, and justice, and therefore God’s contrivance.
851. Illumination. It is becoming of him, who is infinite in
understanding and has many things in full and perfect view at once, and
when he speaks sees all things that have any manner of agreement with
his words and knows how to adapt his words to many things and so to
speak infinitely more comprehensively than others, and to speak so as
naturally to point forth many things, I say it becomes such an one, when
he speaks, to speak as to include a manifold instruction in his speech.
The expression in the Old Testament “Out of Egypt have I called my Son”
has respect to two distinct things, as is manifest beyond all
contradiction in many other phrases in the Old Testament applied in the
New.
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