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The Soul
361. Soul of Man. Matter. Thought.
Vid. Mind, p. [8] 40.
IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL
1. Immortality of the Soul. The immortality of the soul may
thus be argued: men, or intelligent beings, are the consciousness of the
creation, whereby the universe is conscious of its own being, and of
what is done in it, of the actions of the Creator and governor with
respect to it. Now except the world had such a consciousness of itself,
it would be altogether in vain that it was. If the world is not
conscious of its being, it had as good not be as be, as is very clear,
for the creation was known as much in every respect from all eternity as
it is now, to the Creator. Now it is as evident that the world is as
much in being, if this consciousness lasts but a little while and then
ceases, as it would be if there was no consciousness of it — that is,
after the consciousness ceases, from that time forth forever it is in
vain that there ever was such a consciousness. For instance, when the
earth is destroyed, if its consciousness does not remain it is in vain
that ever it has been.
20. Immortality of the Soul. How does it seem to grate upon
one to think that an intelligent being, that consciousness, should be
put out forever so as never to know that it ever did think or had a
being! If it be put out as a punishment, it can never know that it is
punished, never reflect on the justice of God or anything of that
nature.
865. The Immortality of the Human Soul. It need not be looked
upon as any objection to men’s remaining in being after the death of
their bodies, that the beasts that are made for man cease to be when
they die. For it is manifest, in fact, that man is the end of the rest
of the creatures in this lower world. This world, with all its parts,
inanimate, vegetative, and sensitive, was made for an habitation for
man during his present state: and if man be the end of the rest of the
creatures, for which the rest were made, and to whose use they are
subordinated, then man is
instar omnium.
The end of all is equivalent to the whole. Therefore there is no need
of anything else to be preserved: nothing is lost, no part is in vain.
If the end of all be preserved, all is preserved: because he is all,
the rest is only for his occasional use. The beasts subserve man’s use
in the present state: and then, though they cease, yet their end is
obtained, and their good, which is their end, remains still in man.
Though the tent that was set up for man to sojourn in during his state
of probation, ceases when that occasion is over, surely there is no
argument that the inhabitant ceases too.
And
that the beasts were made for man, affords a good positive argument for
a future state of man’s existence. For that all other creatures in this
lower world are made for man, and that he himself should be made for no
more than they, viz., a short continuance in this world to enjoy
the good things of it is unreasonable.
1006. Immortality of the Soul. Some part of the world,
viz. that which is the highest, the head and the end of the rest,
must be of eternal duration — even the intelligent, reasonable
creatures. For if those creatures, this head and end of all the rest of
the creation, comes to an end and is annihilated, it is the same thing
as if the whole were annihilated. If the world be of a temporal duration
and then drops into nothing, it is in vain, i.e. no end is
obtained worthy of God. There is nobody but what will own that if God
had created the world and then it had dropped into nothing the next
minute, it would have been in vain. No end could be obtained worthy of
God, and the only reason is that the end would have been so small: by
reason of the small continuance of the good obtained by it, it is
infinitely little. And so it is still infinitely little if it stands a
million of ages and then drops into nothing. That is as a moment in the
sight of God. If the good obtained by the creation of the world be of so
long continuance, it is equally small, when we compare it with God, as
one moment. It is in comparison of him absolutely equivalent to nothing,
and therefore an end not worthy of him. No end is worthy of an infinite
God but an infinite end. Therefore, the good that is obtained must be of
infinite duration. If it be not so, who shall fix the bounds? Who shall
say a million years is long enough? If it be, who shall say a good of a
thousand years continuance does not become the wisdom of God? And if it
does, how can one say but that less still would not answer the ends of
wisdom? If it would, who can say that the sovereignty of God shall not
fix on a good of a minute’s continuance as sufficient — which is as
great, in comparison with him, as a million years? The only reason why a
good of a minute’s continuance is not great enough to become the Creator
of the world is that it is a good so little when compared with him, and
the same reason stands in equal force against a good of any limited
duration whatsoever.
If
there be nothing that ever began to be, or that ever God made worthy to
exist, or whose existence was a thing valuable or worthy for the most
high to value, then why did God ever cause it to have existence? But if
otherwise, if it be valuable or worthy for the Most High to value, then
why should its existence eternally cease after it has been a little
while? If it be said, because, though it existed but a little while, its
end was obtained, and so it may be thrown by as useless for the future,
I ask, what end? On the supposition that nothing that ever began to be
remains, then no end ever obtained remains. Nothing in any respect new
or lately arrived at, or that was not from all eternity and before any
creature was made, remains, if the whole creation ceases after it has
been a little while or (which is tantamount) if the chief creatures that
are the end of the inferior creatures cease forever after they have
existed a little while.
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